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INNOVATIONS IN GOVERNANCE: A
FUNCTIONAL TYPOLOGY OF PRIVATE
GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS
TRACEY M. ROBERTS†
INTRODUCTION
Biodiversity loss, fishery collapse, deforestation, climate change,
conflicts over natural resources, economic migration, and increasing
inequality threaten economic and social stability throughout the
world. These negative externalities have accompanied the economic
gains that globalization has brought to many countries. Recent
advances in communications technology have allowed communities to
overcome geographic limits and act collectively to address those
impacts. Communities are meeting their demand for governance not
only through formal government and legislative and regulatory
processes, but also through direct negotiations with other interested
parties. Increasingly, groups are turning to private governance, rather
than formal government, to address their needs.
Private governance institutions provide governance without
government. They are rules and structures by which individuals,
communities, firms, civic organizations, and other entities govern
their interests without the direct involvement of the state or its
subsidiaries. Private governance institutions are limitless in their
variety. Political science, sociology, law, and economics literature
describes hundreds of variations of private governance institutions
throughout the world that have developed their own community1
based rules for resource management and conflict resolution. This
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College, J.D. Vanderbilt University Law School, LL.M. New York University School of Law.
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1. See Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction to UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE
AS A COMMONS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 3, 8–9 (Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom eds.,
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article will only examine a few that have been developed in the last
two decades or adapted in recent years to address significant social
costs and environmental externalities arising from globalized trade:
education and mobilization initiatives, firm contractual arrangements,
corporate social responsibility programs, socially responsible
investment, codes of conduct, environmental management systems,
disclosure and reporting initiatives, learning initiatives, models and
meta-standards, cooperatives, and voluntary standards, certification,
2
and labeling mechanisms.
This article advances the private governance literature in three
ways. First, the article outlines the descriptive and analytical
shortcomings of existing taxonomies used to classify private
governance institutions. Second, the article examines public demand
for governance and the ways private governance institutions meet
3
that demand. The article argues that private governance institutions
arise in response to government failure at one or more stages of the
regulatory process. This government failure may result, for example,
from collective action problems, public choice dilemmas, rent-seeking

2008); see also Indiana University’s Digital Library of the Commons, available at
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/ (compiling the existing literature on common-pool resources,
including governance issues).
2. While this article may have implications for formal government, it does not specifically
examine or address the variety of hybrid forms or other “new governance” systems that have
recently been initiated and developed by formal government, such as public voluntary programs
and negotiated agreements. New governance diverges from traditional command-and-control
forms of governmental regulation to include experimental programs, framework agreements,
stakeholder developed rules, revisable standards, benchmarks for improvement, and public and
peer participation mechanisms to ensure accountability. See David M. Trubek & Louise G.
Trubek, New Governance & Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation,
13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539, 541–42 (2007). While many of the new governance processes and
forms may be similar to those we see in private governance institutions, formal government
generally provides the framework for their initiation, development, and support in most studies
of these systems. See id.; Gainne de Burca, New Governance and Experimentalism: An
Introduction, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 227, 228 (2010). But see Jason M. Solomon, New Governance,
Preemptive Self-regulation, and the Blurring of Boundaries in Regulatory Theory and Practice,
2010 WIS. L. REV. 591 (2010) (diverging from the common usage to identify “new governance”
as an approach, regulatory strategy, or tool for both public and private contexts which “blurs the
boundaries between state-centered and self-regulatory, public and private” distinctions).
3. Thomas P. Lyon, Environmental Governance: An Economic Perspective, in
GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 43, 43 (Magali A. Delmas & Oran R. Young eds., 2009)
(suggesting that, from an economic point of view, demand for governance may arise from
consumers seeking products or services from companies that have a record of fair treatment of
their workers, fair payment to their agricultural suppliers, or environmentally sound
operations); Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods, In Whose Benefit? Explaining Regulatory Change
in Global Politics, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 1, 29, 33 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire
Woods eds., 2009).
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behavior, regulatory capture risks, and the challenge of funding
public goods. The article also identifies the institutions’ innovative
responses to market failures, including transaction costs, information
asymmetries, agency problems, moral hazard, anti-competitive
behavior, and externalities, all of which create the need for regulation
in the first place.
Finally, the article identifies a number of insights that a
functional typology of private governance institutions yields. First, a
functional typology clarifies the strengths of each type of private
governance institution, thereby revealing key structures needed at
each stage of the regulatory process, and suggesting improvements for
both private governance and formal government. Second, the
functional typology suggests that effective governance does not
require that a single institution substitute for formal government at all
stages of the regulatory process. Private governance institutions may
complement formal government at key junctures, or they may
coordinate and collaborate with each other to create network or
ensemble regimes with the capacity to substitute formal government
entirely. In fact, collaboration may be preferred, based on the
complexities of the social and ecological systems that private
governance and formal government are attempting to manage, as well
as considerations associated with the theory of the firm. On the other
hand, private governance institutions may compete with formal
government through preemption and other crowding-out effects.
Private governance institutions may also compete with one another
through free-riding, dilution, and confusion. Sorting the institutions
by function clarifies what each institution brings to the regulatory
process, what each institution lacks, and how the institution may be
supported or improved.
The sorting process also underscores the importance of funding
mechanisms in an institution’s overall effectiveness as a regulator.
Efforts to analyze private governance institutions alongside
institutions in which government plays a significant role, such as
negotiated agreements, public voluntary programs, and other forms
4
of new governance, have obscured the roles that funding mechanisms
play in private governance because these functions are supplied
largely by the tax system and the budgetary process in formal
government contexts. Finally, the analysis identifies one type of
private governance institution that currently attempts to substitute for

4. See supra note 2.
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government at all stages of the regulatory process: voluntary
standards, certification, and labeling systems.
The article is organized as follows. Part I describes existing
taxonomies and their shortcomings. Part II describes the
circumstances that give rise to a demand for private governance at
each stage of the regulatory process and the barriers and hazards that
block effective regulation by formal government at each stage. Part II
also organizes private governance institutions according to the
functions they serve in overcoming these barriers and hazards. The
article then identifies the key characteristics or structures needed at
each stage of the regulatory process to ensure effectiveness. Part III
describes how certain private governance institutions also compete
with formal government and other private governance institutions for
regulatory space.
I. THE DESCRIPTIVE AND ANALYTICAL LIMITS OF THE EXISTING
TAXONOMIES
Identifying what makes private governance institutions reliable,
effective regulators is a meaningful exercise for a number of reasons.
5
Parties that generate negative externalities may use private
governance to avoid formal regulation. Private governance
institutions not only complement formal government as well as other
private governance institutions in order to meet demands for
governance, they can also preempt formal regulation and compete
with one another for participants, consumers, investors, and
6
7
regulatory space. Consequences include “greenwashing” or
5. As long as the total benefits to society from the activity outweigh the total harms
caused by the activity, society enjoys a net gain in welfare. However, the individuals who enjoy
the benefits of an activity or transaction may not be the only parties who bear the costs of that
activity or transaction. When the costs associated with an activity or transaction are borne by
third parties or by society at large, these costs are said to have been “externalized” and the harm
is regarded as an “externality.” NATHANIEL O. KEOHANE & SHEILA M. OLMSTEAD, MARKETS
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 66 (2007) (“An externality results when the actions of one individual
(or firm) have a direct, unintentional, and uncompensated effect on the well-being of other
individuals or the profits of other firms.”).
6. These activities are described in more detail in Part III, infra.
7. Greenwashing is a term used to describe the concealment of an organization’s
environmental harms while advertising that the organization is acting to protect the
environment. See Andrew Hoffman & Stephanie Bertels, Who Is Part of the Environmental
Movement?, in GOOD COP, BAD COP: ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS AND THEIR STRATEGIES
TOWARD BUSINESS 48, 62 (Thomas P. Lyon ed., 2010) (“[G]reenwashing [is] a term that
implies presenting misleading information to conceal an organization’s abuse of the
environment and present a positive public image.”). The term appears to have come into use
with accusations that firms were “whitewashing” their “green” credentials or performance.
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misinformation and fraud in meeting consumers’ and investors’ social
8
and environmental preferences.
Previously, scholars have attempted to classify the diverse array
of private governance institutions by their dominant stakeholder
constituencies, based on whether those groups are primarily (1) firms
and business groups, (2) nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and
civic participants or community actors, (3) a hybrid of business groups
and NGOs or civic participants, (4) formal government partnering
with business, non-governmental, or civic participants, or (5) a
9
combination of all these constituents.
Using this sectoral approach, scholars criticize certain
institutions, suggesting that they will fail to serve the public interest
10
because the stakeholders are not drawn broadly from all sectors.
This strategy draws on a normative or prescriptive form of
stakeholder theory where more equitable outcomes are achieved by
11
including all parties with a stake in those outcomes. Other scholars
suggest that the regulatory regime will fail because stakeholder
groups lack all of the required institutional competencies to function
12
properly. Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal refine the stakeholder
analysis, arguing that for private governance institutions to regulate in
the public interest, the stakeholders must (1) address all stages of the
regulatory process, and (2) collectively possess certain competencies
to address the various stages of regulation such as independence,
13
representativeness, expertise, and operational capacity. Abbott and
Snidal explain that because businesses, NGOs, and government have
8. Eric L. Lane, Consumer Protection in the Eco-Mark Era: A Preliminary Survey and
Assessment of Anti-Greenwashing Activity and Eco-Mark Enforcement, 9 J. MARSHALL REV.
INT’L PROP. L. 742 (2010).
9. Graeme Auld et al., The New Corporate Social Responsibility, 33 ANN. REV. ENV’T &
RESOURCES 413 (2008); see also Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance
Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the Law, in THE POLITICS OF
GLOBAL REGULATION 44, 46–57 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009); Maria Carmen
Lemos & Arun Agrawal, Environmental Governance and Political Science, in GOVERNANCE
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 69, 77–80 (Magali A. Delmas & Oran R. Young eds., 2009); Magali A.
Delmas & Oran R. Young, Introduction to GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 3, 8 (Magali
A. Delmas & Oran R. Young eds., 2009).
10. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 64.
11. R. EDWARD FREEMAN ET AL., STAKEHOLDER THEORY 170 (2010) (identifying the
use of stakeholder theory by scholars as a normative and prescriptive goal to permit indigenous
populations to have their interests taken into account by corporate decision-makers, and as an
ideal method for reaching solutions that accommodate environmental equity, economic
development, and broader environmental objectives).
12. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 46.
13. Id. at 46, 64.
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different competencies, “it is difficult, if not impossible” for private
governance institutions to have all of the necessary competencies to
14
contribute to all stages of the regulatory process. They conclude that
the institutions most likely to provide regulation in the public interest
15
are those that have stakeholder participation from each sector.
First, as a descriptive matter, institutions and their constituents
do not always fit neatly into the business, civic, or government
categories. There are frequently degrees of involvement of all three
16
interests in each type of private governance institution. Second,
private governance institutions may appear to be the same in terms of
stakeholder composition and competencies, but have different rules
17
and function in very different ways. Similar institutional structures
18
may be used by business or by purely civic institutions. Furthermore,
14. Id. at 46.
15. Id.
16. Abbott and Snidal develop a map that identifies the location of specific organizations
within a “Governance Triangle” based on the extent to which states, firms, and NGOs
participate directly in the management and operation of a particular organization or regulatory
regime, recognizing the diversity in institutional forms and variation in sector control. See id. at
46–57.
17. See generally Benjamin Cashore et al., Legitimizing Political Consumerism: The Case
of Forest Certification in North America and Europe, in POLITICS, PRODUCTS, AND MARKETS
181 (Michele Micheletti et al. eds., 2003). For example, Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), an
organization developed by environmental organizations, timber traders, indigenous groups,
forest laborer organizations, and other stakeholders in 1993, created a certification and labeling
system for forest products and their retailers to encourage sustainable management of forests
globally. Graeme Auld et al., Certification Schemes and the Impacts on Forests and Forestry, 33
ANN. REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES 187, 189–90 (2008). The Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI),
created by the American Forest and Paper Association, an industry trade association, developed
a certification and labeling scheme for forestry products to compete with the system created by
FSC. Id. at 191. SFI’s standards are process-oriented rather than prescriptive, and consequently,
less stringent than those of FSC. Id. at 192. Initially, the public could differentiate the standards
of the two organizations based on the identity of their participants. FSC was a nonprofit
organization and SFI was business firm, a subsidiary of the American Forest and Paper
Association. SFI was later converted into a tax-exempt nonprofit organization with tripartite
governance that includes environmental organizations and government members as well as
business and industrial interests. SFI now bears the same indicia of civic representation and the
organizational structure reflects the same capacity for “representativeness” as FSC; however,
the actual standards behind the two organizations remain significantly different. Here, despite
an appearance of “representativeness,” the composition of the institution is not an accurate
signal as to whether the institution is undertaking voluntary regulation that will have an overall
beneficial effect on the greater community. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 76, 78. In such
cases, the public cannot discern whether an institution is meeting their demand for regulation by
looking at the relative participation by NGOs, business, and government in the governing
structure.
18. Some socially responsible investors, such as Domini Social Investments and Pax
World, are for-profit organizations, which were developed to provide a return to their investors
on a portfolio of investments that meet certain environmental and social criteria. Others, such as
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while the rules that private governance institution constituents
develop may be evenhanded initially, these rules may change over
19
time to favor the interests of one group over another. In addition,
private governance institutions may fall prey to internal conflicts of
20
interest that belie their organizational status. Third, formal
organization may not reflect underlying control of the private
governance institution. Parties from each sector may be involved
directly or indirectly, making it difficult to discern which sector is
21
actually in control. For some private governance structures,
government plays a significant role even though it is not a direct
stakeholder or participant in the development of the institution.
Governments interact with private firms in a variety of ways to
22
coordinate regulatory activity. Legislators may consult with firms
during the legislative process. Government agencies may consult with
private firms when they develop regulations pursuant to legislative
23
authority, and agencies may delegate certain aspects of regulatory

the Acumen Fund are nonprofit organizations that provide no monetary return on investment
to investors, but devote 100% of their net profits to further their social causes. Compare
Sustainable & Responsible Investing, CALVERT INVESTMENTS, http://www.calvert.com/sri.html
(last visited Oct. 4, 2011), DOMINI SOCIAL INVESTMENTS, http://www.domini.com (last visited
Oct. 4, 2011), and PAX WORLD, http://www.paxworld.com (last visited Oct. 8, 2011), with About
Us, ACUMEN FUND, http://www.acumenfund.org/about-us.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2011).
19. See infra Part III.
20. For example, the Nature Conservancy has had organizational structures in place to
avoid conflicts of interest for many years, including specific written policies and a broad-based
board of directors; it nevertheless became entangled in scandals associated with rent-seeking by
its members and trustees in 2003. In 2003 the Washington Post disclosed that the organization
had engaged in a number of questionable transactions with the organization’s trustees and
board members and had begun resource extraction activities on one of its nature preserves. See
Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Charity’s Land Deals to Be Scrutinized; Senators Send Letter
to Nature Conservancy, WASH. POST, May 10, 2003, at A2. The organization was required to
submit to an audit by the Internal Revenue Service and they received Congressional requests to
attend public hearings. Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, IRS Toughens Scrutiny of Land
Gifts, WASH. POST, July 1, 2004, at A1; Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Nature Conservancy
Faces Panel Review, WASH. POST, July 17, 2003, at A19. The organization responded by
suspending land sales and reviewing its governing documents and practices. Conservation Group
Alters Rules After Criticism Over Its Practices, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2003, at N17.
21. Some scholars have begun to raise questions about whether institutions developed by
NGOs funded with private resources accurately represent the interests of the public or civil
sector. See Thomas P. Lyon, Introduction to GOOD COP, BAD COP: ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS
AND THEIR STRATEGIES TOWARD BUSINESS 1, 5 (Thomas P. Lyon ed., 2010).
22. Auld et al., supra note 9, at 420; see also Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 545–49 (2000).
23. Auld et al., supra note 9, at 420.
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24

authority to private firms. Firms and government authorities may
25
jointly negotiate standards and implementation processes.
Governments now offer voluntary programs and negotiated
26
agreements as new hybrid forms of regulation and have begun to
27
incorporate “soft law” and “reflexive law” elements into regulatory
28
regimes. Many private governance institutions mimic programs
29
developed and funded by government. Some private governance
30
structures exist in the shadow of the law. In some instances, it is the
threat of future government regulation that causes private actors with
vested interests to develop private governance structures in the first
31
place. Private firms would not have developed other private
governance institutions if the courts were not available to enforce

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 33–37 (1997).
27. See John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock, Introduction to HARD CHOICES, SOFT
LAW: VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL
GOVERNANCE 3, 5 (John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2004); Jason M. Solomon, New
Governance, Preemptive Self-Regulation, and the Blurring of Boundaries in Regulatory Theory
and Practice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 591, 594 (2010); David M. Trubek & Louise Trubek, New
Governance & Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUMB. J.
EUR. L. 539, 542 (2007); Neil Walker & Grainne de Burca, Reconceiving Law & New
Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 519, 531 (2007).
28. See Trubek & Trubek, supra note 27, at 548; Walker & de Burca, supra note 27, at 527
(describing the shift from command-and-control regulation to these new forms).
29. For example, following the success of the Toxic Release Inventory, a number of firms
and organizations began to employ voluntary disclosure and reporting requirements to signal
market differentiation. See generally Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental
Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J.
257, 367 (2001).
30. Margaret M. Blair et al., The New Role for Assurance Services in Global Commerce, 33
J. CORP. L. 325, 329 (2008) (citing Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A
Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 225 (1982); Lisa Bernstein, Opting
Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 115 (1992); and Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation through Rules, Norms and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001)).
31. The chemical industry, for example, developed the Responsible Care Program
following the Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal with the goal of avoiding the institution of
regulations upon the chemical industry, and in 1992, following the Rio Summit, the Chamber of
Commerce developed a Business Charter for Sustainable Development to deflect possible
global environmental regulation. David Vogel, The Private Regulation of Global Corporate
Conduct, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 151, 159, 167–68 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire
Woods eds., 2009).
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obligations under contract law and the Uniform Commercial Code or
32
to impose common law or statutory tort liability against those firms.
Other scholars focus, in part, on stakeholder intent or motive,
suggesting that regulatory failure in the private governance context is
33
the result of mixed or compromised motives. However, stakeholders
have a wide variety of motives for undertaking voluntary regulation.
Firms undertake corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs
34
primarily to reduce waste, improve efficiency, increase profits,
35
achieve market differentiation, adapt to shifting business norms and
36
values, and enhance firm reputation with investors, markets, and
37
consumers. Firms use contracts to regulate suppliers, reduce risks
38
from contract and tort liability, and shift the risk of loss in
39
transactions. Collectively, firms develop industry-wide codes of
conduct to level the playing field among competitors and reduce the
40
costs of compliance. Firms create and adhere to voluntary

32. For instance, firms use contracts to control the quality of products being delivered
through their supply chains to maintain quality standards. When the goods they sell are
credence goods (goods for which neither they nor their consumers can tell the quality prior to
purchase), firms are motivated by the risks associated with breach of contract claims and
potential tort liability to set up private regulatory mechanisms.
33. See Auld et al., supra note 9, at 416.
34. Id. at 415; David Vogel, Private Global Business Regulation, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI.
261, 268–69 (2008) (suggesting that much of the business literature exaggerates the cost-savings
or other “win–win” benefits from shifting to more sustainable practices, and indicating that
studies have shown little correlation between financial performance and performance along
social and environmental parameters).
35. Auld et al., supra note 9, at 415; Lyon, supra note 3, at 29; Mattli & Woods, supra note
3, at 56; see also Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 70. The need for market differentiation may
arise from a disaster within the industry that has widespread negative impacts on public
perception of the industry as a whole and could potentially lead to regulation. Vogel, supra note
34, at 268.
36. Id. at 269 (suggesting that changes in business mores have contributed significantly to
the shift in business practices, and attributing this change to an expansion of firm accountability
not only to shareholders but to other communities that are impacted by their decisions); Vogel,
supra note 31, at 170; see also Benjamin Cashore et al., Can Non-State Global Governance Be
Legitimate? An Analytical Framework, 1 REG. & GOV. 347 (2007). But see Abbott & Snidal,
supra note 9, at 70 (suggesting that while these kinds of responses to the logic of
appropriateness may have long-term impacts, competition drives firms to reduce and externalize
costs).
37. Vogel, supra note 31, at 169. A firm’s desire to enhance its reputation may arise in
response to activities by NGOs to shame and blame the firm or the industry through media
exposes, protests, and boycotts.
38. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
2029, 2033–34 (2005).
39. Id. at 2046–47.
40. Vogel, supra note 31, at 169; Mattli & Woods, supra note 3, at 35.
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regulations to seek favor with regulatory authorities and to insert
41
themselves in the regulatory process. They also do so to reduce the
42
degree of government monitoring that currently occurs, and to
43
preempt proposed governmental regulation. Firms undertake hybrid
44
approaches to governance when facing potential regulation,
preferring to negotiate standards and regulatory solutions over typical
45
46
forms of state intervention. In addition, investor pressures and
efforts by NGOs to hold companies responsible for the
environmental and social impacts of their activities and the activities
of their supply chains have driven participation in private governance
47
regimes.
Government entities also have a broad array of reasons for
collaborating with business and nonprofit entities in voluntary
regulatory schemes. Governmental entities may decide to support
these alternatives because (1) a given governmental entity lacks
48
authority to develop a mandatory program, (2) a voluntary program
may offer an opportunity to test new approaches through pilot
49
projects, (3) a voluntary program may reduce the costs of obtaining
environmental improvement compared to traditional command-and-

41. Lyon, supra note 3, at 58.
42. Id.
43. Id. An increased threat of governmental regulation will increase firm attempts at
corporate self-regulation. Lyon suggests that regulatory preemption may decrease political
transaction costs and leaves open the possibility that consumers will organize if preemption
measures do not result in sufficient environmental improvement. See also Vogel, supra note 34,
at 268 (“In some cases, business self-regulation represents a political strategy for avoiding
additional government regulation.”)
44. Id. at 57. The choice to engage is thought to follow a nonlinear model. Id. at 66. Some
voluntary mechanisms, such as public voluntary programs, are undertaken when the threat of
regulation is weak, and others, such as negotiated agreements, when the threat is stronger. Id. at
57. Firms would tend to pursue voluntary abatement if the threat of government regulation is
low or if the threat of governmental regulation is high. Id. at 66. Intermediate threats of
regulation would not appear to prompt firms to take action. Id.
45. Auld et al., supra note 9, at 420.
46. Philipp Pattberg, The Institutionalization of Private Governance: How Business and
Nonprofit Organizations Agree on Transnational Rules, 18 GOVERNANCE 589, 598–602 (2005)
(describing the development of a global reporting initiative from demands by investors for
information on firm environmental performance to permit investors to assess the risk of their
investments).
47. Vogel, supra note 34, at 268 (noting that the top reason for firms accepting private
governance is that NGOs make global brands and global supply networks into a source of
vulnerability through “name and shame campaigns”).
48. See Lyon, supra note 3, at 60–61.
49. See id. at 60.
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50

control regulation, or (4) a voluntary program may improve
51
government–business relationships.
Regardless of which sector or set of stakeholders develops the
standards, and no matter their motives for doing so, some structures
are effective and beneficial to society while others are not.
Correlations between stakeholder intent and effectiveness may not be
consistent. Voluntary standards promulgated by NGOs that are
neither strict nor enforceable will not abate risks or internalize
potential costs into the price of the goods—the risk of loss will remain
with the general public. On the other hand, voluntary efforts by firms
that involve a shift to new technology may guarantee improved
environmental performance and save the government and the
taxpayer significant costs associated with monitoring. The lines drawn
between public and business interests obscure important structures
needed for effective regulation.
In summary, classifying governance systems based on the
composition of their constituents misses the point; the purpose of
classification is to predict which private governance institutions will
meet public demand for governance and which will not. Because the
conventional taxonomy is limited in descriptive and analytical
capacity, a new paradigm for examining private governance
institutions is needed. The next section formulates a new typology
based on the functions that private governance institutions serve in
addressing government and market failures.
II. HOW PRIVATE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS OVERCOME
GOVERNMENT FAILURES THAT OCCUR AT EACH STAGE OF
REGULATION AND ADDRESS MARKET FAILURE
Abbott and Snidal identify five stages of regulatory activity
captured by the acronym “ANIME”: (1) agenda-setting, (2)
negotiation of standards, (3) implementation, (4) monitoring, and (5)
52
enforcement. At each stage, the process may break down,
undermining the purpose for which the regulations are being
promulgated. Formal governments fail to regulate successfully for a
number of reasons: (1) lack of authority, resources, or political will to
regulate at all; (2) inability to coordinate and collaborate across
jurisdictional boundaries; (3) inability to generate regulation that sets

50. See id.
51. See id.
52. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 46.
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enforceable standards; (4) inability to monitor and enforce the
53
standards that they have set; and (5) diversion of the regulatory
process by interested actors to their own purposes. In addition, the
allocation of responsibility and the costs associated with developing,
implementing, monitoring, and enforcing the rules can also give rise
54
to a breakdown in the regulatory process.
This section describes the different stages of regulation and the
kinds of barriers and hazards that prevent formal government from
regulating or cause public regulation to fail to serve the public
interest. Because demand for governance remains unmet, a
regulatory gap exists that private governance systems can fill. This
section, therefore, also describes how private governance institutions
address these governance deficits.
A. Agenda-Setting Institutions
At the initial stage of the governmental regulatory process,
public interest, industry, or business groups identify an agenda they
would like to have their legislative or regulatory bodies meet. Parties
bearing externalized social costs articulate their concerns, investigate
activities that cause those harms, identify the parties engaging in
those activities, and appeal to government actors to regulate those
activities. Abbott and Snidal identify this stage as the “Agenda55
Setting” stage.
Before any regulation can occur, legislators or regulatory bodies
must be aware of social costs. Because ecological systems behave in
nonlinear ways, many social costs, such as those associated with
56
57
environmental harm, are not readily apparent. In addition,

53. Vogel, supra note 31, at 160.
54. ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 262–63 (2009)
[hereinafter UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY] (“When the rules related to the
distribution of benefits are made broadly consistent with the distribution of costs, participants
are more willing to pitch in to keep a resource well-maintained and sustainable. Relating user
inputs to the benefits they obtain is a crucial element of establishing a fair system. If some users
get all the benefits and pay few of the costs, others are not willing to follow rules over time.
Thus, fairness is a crucial attribute of the rules of robust systems.” (citations omitted)).
55. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 8, at 63–64.
56. For those concerned about natural resources and ecological systems, the damage
suffered by these systems may be difficult to discern or estimate. Oran R. Young, Institutions
and Environmental Change: The Scientific Legacy of a Decade of IDGEC Research, in
INSTITUTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 3 (Oran R. Young et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter
Young, Institutions and Environmental Change]. Biological systems frequently behave in nonlinear ways, and are subject to thresholds and tipping points. Id. Collapse may be imminent, but
the signs may not be readily apparent. Id. Ecological systems also behave in a non-linear
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globalization has shifted manufacturing from developed to
developing nations, making social harms borne by residents in
developing countries less visible to those enjoying lower prices that
58
result from externalizing those costs. Proponents of regulation must
also identify the parties responsible for those social harms and
persuade legislative bodies to take action. However, effective
oversight requires information, and gathering information can be
59
costly and difficult. In addition, identifying affected parties and
coordinating them to engage across vast geographic distances,
thereby bridging cultural, technological, and language barriers, is
challenging. A number of private governance institutions have arisen
to address this need.
In recent years, NGOs, church groups, and other advocacy
organizations have begun to identify social and environmental costs
and disseminate information to spur action by legislative bodies.
These education and mobilization initiatives, however, are not the
source of all private regulatory activity. Insurance companies now
lobby regulatory bodies for new regulation and mandate certain
practices among their insured parties that will reduce the companies’
risk of loss. Socially responsible investment (SRI) firms use capital
markets and screening programs to incentivize firm management to
shift firm practices into alignment with their investors’ social and
environmental concerns. Voluntary standards, certification, and
labeling mechanisms cultivate consumer markets to select products
from firms that conform to specified social and environmental
practices.
manner: they are frequently subject to thresholds and tipping points, and collapse can occur
quickly after a long period of what appears to be incremental change. Oran R. Young,
Governance for Sustainable Development in a World of Rising Interdependencies, in
GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 12, 39 (Magali A. Delmas & Oran R. Young eds., 2009)
[hereinafter Young, Governance for Sustainable Development].
57. Occasionally, catastrophic events, such as the Bhopal disaster, coffee collapse, labor
scandals, or human rights scandals will bring these social costs to public attention.
58. See Vogel, supra note 31, at 159.
59. Mattli & Woods, supra note 3, at 28; see, e.g., Leslie Kaufman, Tracking Flow of Oil on
His Own, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2011, at A17 (describing efforts of a conservationist to gather
and disseminate information on the environmental impact of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill
after being frustrated with government efforts to do so). While technology has advanced
communication to a level that government censorship becomes less feasible on a global scale,
some governments are still able to exert control over information either by limiting media
access or through disinformation campaigns. See, e.g., William Yong & Robert F. Worth, Iran
Clamps Down on Reporting on Protest Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2010, at A4; Andrew
Jacobs & Miguel Helft, Google, Citing Attack, Threatens to Exit China, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13,
2010, at A1.
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1. Education and Mobilization Initiatives
Increasingly, civic organizations have taken an entrepreneurial
role in exposing social costs by communicating them to the public and
galvanizing action with respect to environmental and social
60
concerns. Since the 1980s, NGOs, churches, and other groups have
developed civil society campaigns to draw into question the activities
61
of certain high-profile business entities and groups. The groups have
assumed the costs associated with gathering information about firm
62
performance, and used media campaigns to disseminate information
63
about the environmental and social impacts of firm activities. Civic
organizations, in addition to disclosing social costs and identifying the
parties that have contributed to the problem, may also communicate
64
this information to the public in a way that will prompt action. They
may offer a plan for action to empower the public to overcome
collective action problems and call for institutional change either in
the form of legislation, enforcement of existing regulations, or, if
those needs will not be met by formal government, by galvanizing
65
interest groups to develop private governance institutions.

60. Mattli & Woods, supra note 3, at 29 (describing the efforts of Greenpeace, Amnesty
International, and the Sierra Club in seeking a regulatory response to the Union Carbide
disaster in Bhopal, India); Vogel, supra note 31, at 168–70 (describing the name and shame
campaigns directed against unhealthy working conditions and the employment of child laborers
by textile and clothing manufacturers, human rights violations and environmental harms by
mining companies, and sourcing of illegally and unsustainably harvested wood by lumber
retailers). For example, in 1997 the Rainforest Action Network undertook a highly visible
campaign against Home Depot to urge the company to stop purchasing wood and paper
products from old growth forests and substitute sustainably harvested wood sources. Jennifer
Krill, Rainforest Action Network, in GOOD COP, BAD COP: ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS AND
THEIR STRATEGIES TOWARD BUSINESS 208, 218–19 (Thomas P. Lyon ed., 2010).
61. Sasha Courville, Social Accountability Audits: Challenging or Defending Democratic
Governance?, 25 LAW & POL’Y 269, 271 (2003).
62. Mattli & Woods, supra note 3, at 28–29 (attributing this phenomenon, in part, to the
availability of the Internet, which reduced the costs of communication and information
gathering).
63. Courville, supra note 61, at 271.
64. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 64; Vogel, supra note 31, at 168–69 (name-andshame campaigns directed at prominent firms identify shortfalls in corporate responsibility).
65. Vogel, supra note 31, at 171 (“[A] critical role has been played by NGOs whose anticorporate campaigns have creatively taken advantage of the vulnerability of global firms to
threats to their public reputation and the value of their brands. . . . [T]hese organizations have
effectively mobilized the diffuse interests of those adversely affected by the shortcomings of
existing regulatory mechanisms. Their efforts to create new forms of business regulation have
been often supported by foundations, trade unions, social movements, and in some cases,
governments.”); see also Mattli & Woods, supra note 3, at 28–29 (describing the emergence of
NGOs as policy entrepreneurs).
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As a result of these campaigns, targeted companies are shifting
their practices to reduce their negative environmental and social
impacts through private governance initiatives, such as adoption of
66
CSR programs, codes of conduct, environmental management
systems, and through participation in government-based hybrid
efforts, such as public voluntary programs and negotiated
67
agreements. Corporate involvement in these programs stems from
68
the desire to upgrade the firm image, to reduce financial risks
associated with education and mobilization initiatives and “name and
shame” campaigns, and generally to restore the firm’s social license to
69
operate.
2. Insurance Contracts
Insurance companies are also acting as regulatory
70
entrepreneurs. Insurance agreements generally enhance efficiency
by permitting parties to spread compliance risks and create
71
economies of scale in managing remediation costs. Facing increased
exposure to higher risk, insurance firms have also begun to demand
72
additional regulation. For example, in the shipping industry, traffic
on navigable waters has risen from expanded trade and increased
73
tanker size. This has increased the likelihood of accidents, leading to
larger payouts associated with lost cargo and environmental and
74
other harms to natural resources and human communities. In
response to increased risk and higher payouts, insurance firms have
taken a more active role in lobbying for regulation of the shipping

66. Auld et al., supra note 9, at 417.
67. Lyon, supra note 3, at 56–63. Because formal governments initiate and fund hybrid
programs, such as public voluntary programs and negotiated agreements, this article does not
cover them to any degree.
68. See Robert Kagan et al., Explaining Corporate Environmental Performance: How Does
Regulation Matter?, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 51, 69 (2003) (noting that some managers seek to
avoid negative publicity and maintain their social license with their communities by going
beyond compliance with mandatory environmental standards).
69. Auld et al., supra note 9, at 417.
70. Mattli & Woods, supra note 3, at 33.
71. See Vandenbergh, supra note 38, at 2063 (noting that, among other things, these
policies can cover past liabilities, costs associated with future requirements for compliance, and
cost overruns on projects to clean up an environmentally damaged property).
72. Mattli & Woods, supra note 3, at 33.
73. Samuel Barrows, Racing to the Top . . . at Last: The Regulation of Safety in Shipping, in
THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 189, 202–06 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds.,
2009).
74. Id.
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76

industry and in enforcing regulations through their contracts. While
individual insurers could impose additional requirements or decline
to insure firms that failed to meet their standards, these insurance
companies and their clients would face a competitive disadvantage.
By seeking government regulation, insurance companies level the
playing field for themselves and their clients.
3. Socially Responsible Investment
Investors also harness the market to pressure firms to manage
77
their environmental and other risks. Focusing primarily on publiclyheld firms, SRI firms direct investors to companies that achieve their
78
financial goals in a socially and environmentally responsible manner.
By offering early recognition and the advantages associated with
expanded access to capital, SRI firms provide economic incentives for
companies to undertake social and environmental harm abatement or
other activities associated with meeting investor preferences. While
some institutional investors support particular governmental or
79
intergovernmental initiatives, others have developed programs to
screen firms based on their performance across a number of social
80
parameters, going beyond firm profitability or return on investment.
SRIs provide information to investors about the environmental and
81
social performance of firms, primarily publicly held firms. SRI
research organizations may collect information by sending
questionnaires to companies to self-report their activities, or SRI
research organizations may pull information provided by reporting
82
and disclosure initiatives or certification programs. The information
83
is rarely verified independently. SRI firms screen companies to
assemble portfolios of investments, and select investments that meet
75. Id. at 203.
76. Id. at 202.
77. Kagan et al., supra note 68, at 82.
78. Courville, supra note 61, at 274.
79. See Cynthia Williams, Civil Society Initiatives and “Soft Law” in the Oil and Gas
Industry, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 457, 488–89 (2003) (describing the involvement of
institutional investors managing $3 trillion in assets in the Extractive Industry Transparency
Initiative, designed to require extractive industry companies to disclose amounts paid to foreign
governments for rights to extract natural resources).
80. These programs may employ an array of approaches, including screens for positive
qualities, screens against negative qualities, and screens to identify the best of a class of
investments without regard to any minimum criteria. Courville, supra note 61, at 274.
81. See id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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positive investor preferences or screen investments to exclude firms
84
that engage in activities that investors have elected to avoid. SRI
firms may also assemble portfolios by identifying the best performing
firms in each sector without identifying a minimum threshold for
85
performance. While initial participants were individual investors and
thus the size of funds under management was small, recent entry of
institutional investors such as state pension funds, universities, and
foundations has increased the funds under management
86
dramatically.
It is unclear whether investment in socially responsible firms
produces desired environmental and social outcomes. If a firm’s
standards are not sufficiently prescriptive or stringent, they may have
little impact. Because no information verification systems exist
regarding firms’ self-reported information, the effectiveness of the
selection and screening process has yet to be determined. Given that
87
social and environmental performance are “credence qualities,”
firms may not provide accurate reports of their performance unless
there is some method to monitor activity, verify self-reported
performance, and provide a credible threat of sanction. In addition,
88
leakage remains a problem: as long as noncompliant businesses may

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Performance and Socially Responsible Investments, FORUM FOR SUSTAINABLE AND
RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, http://www.ussif.org/resources/performance.cfm (last visited Oct. 7,
2011) (indicating a 480% increase in funds under professionally managed SRIs from 1995 to
2010). A number of studies have shown that SRI funds perform comparably to non-SRI mutual
funds. See, e.g., id.; Meir Statman & Denys Glushkov, The Wages of Social Responsibility (Dec.
2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F.); Center for
Responsible Business, University of California (Berkeley) Haas School of Business, Key
Studies, STUDIES OF SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING, http://www.sristudies.org/
Key+Studies (last visited Oct. 7, 2011). Some SRI funds are benchmarked against non-SRI
indices, such as the S&P 500 and the Dow Jones Industrial Average, and in some instances have
outperformed these standard indices. FORUM FOR SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE
INVESTMENT, supra.
87. Credence qualities cannot easily be evaluated before, during, or after normal use. To
determine whether the good has the properties or qualities that a consumer prefers, the
consumer would be required to undertake expensive studies to acquire additional information.
In some instances, it may not be possible for the consumer to learn whether the good has
preferred qualities. Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount
of Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68–69 (1973).
88. Leakage occurs when a market responds to the imposition of a regulation by shifting
demand to goods that are manufactured in jurisdictions where the regulation is not imposed.
When prices increase as a result of regulation, consumers continue to seek lower priced goods
and purchase the goods from jurisdictions where production of the goods are not subject to
regulations and can therefore be manufactured and sold at a lower price.
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obtain capital from alternate sources on similar terms, they may
retain a competitive advantage over compliant firms by continuing to
89
externalize the social costs.
4. Voluntary Standards, Certification, and Labeling Systems
Voluntary standards, certification, and labeling systems are
private governance institutions that set minimum standards for firms,
90
products, or facilities to meet one or more consumer preferences.
They designate a process to verify whether the standards have been
met, provide training for individuals who will inspect the goods or
facilities to verify whether they are in compliance with the standards,
certify the goods or firms that have met the standards, and develop
91
labels to identify the compliant goods and firms. These regimes use

89. Note, however, that social costs may impact a firm’s risk profile. To the extent that a
firm’s activities give rise to grave environmental impacts, civil unrest, work stoppages, media
attention, and injunctive relief or regulatory activity, economic risks to investors increase. Public
awareness of these risks can result in a shift of capital away from these firms. See, e.g., Michael
P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in Global
Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 943–44 (2007) (stating disclosure of environmental release
information through the mandatory Toxic Release Inventory affected the stock prices for firms
with the worst records).
90. These systems go by many names in the different literature. Some scholars call these
institutions non-state market-driven (NMSD) systems. See Benjamin Cashore et al., Can NonState Governance ‘Ratchet Up’ Global Environmental Standards? Lessons from the Forest
Sector, 16 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 158, 162–66 (2007). Others have
identified them as regulatory standards setting (RSS) forms of private governance. See Abbott
& Snidal, supra note 9, at 44–45. Others, in the business world refer to all forms of private
governance as “civil regulation.” See Vogel, supra note 31, at 151. One example of a voluntary
standards, certification, and labeling institution is the Forest Stewardship Council. Following
recognition of the tragedy of the commons dynamic with respect to forests in the 1960s, many
governments elected to privatize their forests. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE
COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 23 (1990)
[hereinafter GOVERNING THE COMMONS]. In some cases, government ownership of the forests
has not made them less susceptible to illegal logging, but more so where governments have
lacked the capacity to monitor and enforce the law. Id. In an attempt to reverse this trend, the
Forest Stewardship Council has developed a system to help enforce existing national laws
against illegal logging by encouraging the logging industry, forest owners, and indigenous
populations to adopt sustainable forest management practices and deter illegal logging by
joining the certification program. See FSC Policy and Standards, FOREST STEWARDSHIP
COUNCIL, http://www.fsc.org/policy_standards.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2011). The
organization certifies and labels forests, forest products, and firms that sell those products. In
exchange for their participation, forest owners and managers and retailers that sell certified
forest products may receive a premium on products they sell. This market premium has not
always eventuated. Michael Richards, Certification in Complex Socio-political Settings: Looking
Forward to the Next Decade, in FOREST TRENDS 26 (2004).
91. Errol Meidinger, Competitive Supragovernmental Regulation: How Could It Be
Democratic?, 8 CHICAGO J. INT’L L. 513, 515 (2008); Cashore et al., supra note 90, at 162–66.
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92

the supply chain to create financial incentives for performance.
Voluntary standards, certification, and labeling systems may create or
capitalize on activist pressure directed toward supply chain anchor
firms in the form of media campaigns, protests, and actual or
93
threatened boycotts. Firms committing to become members of the
certification and labeling system or committing to purchase certified
94
goods avoid these pressures.
In addition, voluntary standards, certification, and labeling
systems are thought to shape public perception of social or
environmental problems by shifting the discourse around social and
95
environmental goods. When the dominant discourse changes,
96
institutional change occurs. Voluntary standards, certification, and
labeling systems target consumer demand by activating norms
97
associated with consumption. By using labels to make externalities
more visible, voluntary standards, certification, and labeling systems
also enhance efficiency; when consumers confront the environmental
impacts of their consumption choices and have the opportunity to pay
a premium to internalize the externality, they may choose the good
98
with a lower environmental or other social cost. These systems not
only enable customers to express existing preferences, but they also
shift those preferences by providing information, rankings, and thirdparty certification. Voluntary standards, certification, and labeling
systems engender and strengthen norms associated with fair trade,
fair wage and labor practices, sustainable harvesting, and the
99
avoidance of environmental harm. By educating and informing
consumers about the consequences of their purchases, these
institutions seek to inculcate certain values and encourage consumers
to internalize standards and set boundaries on what they will and will
not consume.
Table 1 summarizes the hazards that arise at the agenda-setting
stage, the private governance institutions that address those hazards,
92. Auld et al., supra note 9, at 424–25.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See Young, Institutions and Environmental Change, supra note 56, at 8.
96. Id.
97. Norms are internalized rules; individuals who fail to observe norms experience mental
discomfort and may be shunned within their community. Michael A. Livermore, Reviving
Environmental Protection: Preference Directed Regulation and Regulatory Ossification, 25 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 311, 332–33 (2007).
98. Id. at 330.
99. Id. at 326–28.
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what they supply, and the characteristics required for the institutions
to be effective.

Table 1. Agenda-Setting Institutions
Barrier or Hazard
Information
problem:
lack of information
about problem or
cause of problem

Suppliers
Education and
mobilization
initiatives
Voluntary
standards,
certification, and
labeling systems
Socially responsible
investment firms

Collective action
problems:
communication
problems,
coordination
problems

Education and
mobilization
initiatives

Structure Supplied
Information about
problem
Information about
cause

Keys for Effectiveness
Independence
(organizational and
financial) from entity
causing problem

Network for
communication
with the public and
key stakeholders

Convening
stakeholders or
shareholders

Structures to convene
groups and to permit
stakeholder or
shareholder
engagement

Market incentives
to counteract race
to the bottom
dynamics

Marketing

Voluntary
standards,
certification, and
labeling systems
Socially responsible
investment

Race to the bottom
dynamics:
government
incentives are
against regulation

Voluntary
standards,
certification, and
labeling systems

Creation of club
goods

Sufficiently broad
consumer
participation for
market incentive to be
created
Ability to exclude
noncompliant parties
from club

B. Standards-Setting Institutions
At the second stage of the regulatory process, legislative and
regulatory bodies and stakeholders negotiate and set standards and
develop a regulatory scheme for monitoring compliance and
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100

enforcing those standards. However, even when private business
incentives and the public will to regulate exist, a number of barriers
may impede the legislative process, such as collective action
problems, regulatory capture, and rent seeking activity. Businesses
regulate internally to improve their performance along social and
environmental lines, to enhance their image among investors and
lenders, to regain their social license to operate, and to differentiate
themselves in the market so as to achieve a “green” or socially
responsible premium. Supply chain contracts import standards into
jurisdictions where democratic and legal institutions are weak.
Voluntary standards, certification, and labeling mechanisms create
market incentives and lower transaction costs to overcome regulatory
capture, regulatory fragmentation, and the “race to the bottom.”
1. Business Firm Programs
Business firms often engage in a particular self-regulatory
101
activity commonly described as CSR. Firms generally set their own
102
employ existing
policies without input from other parties,
management structures to implement those policies, use internal
hierarchies to obtain feedback about policy impacts, and incentivize
103
compliance through compensation, honors, and other perquisites. In
general, firms that undertake CSR seek a win–win situation; they
hope to increase efficiency and firm profits by reducing waste and
unnecessary costs, and by developing new markets through
104
differentiation to generate premium prices.
2. Supply Chain Contracts
A number of scholars now focus on supply chain contracts as a
105
source of environmental and social regulation. Firms experience
pressures to control suppliers from a variety of sources, including the

100. At the rulemaking stage of the regulatory process, formal governments have begun to
draw on the types of innovations that have arisen in private governance. In setting standards
and developing new rules, governments have begun to require that firms network with and
share information with stakeholders, and include stakeholders in the deliberative regulatory
processes. Trubek & Trubek, supra note 27, at 555.
101. Auld et al., supra note 9, at 414.
102. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 67.
103. Id. at 65.
104. Auld et al., supra note 9, at 422.
105. See Vandenbergh, supra note 89, at 925–26; Michael P. Vandenbergh & Mark A.
Cohen, Climate Change Governance: Boundaries and Leakage, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 221, 226–
29 (2010); Lyon, supra note 21, at 22.
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106

threat of contract or tort liability, consumer demand, targeting by
107
name and shame campaigns and boycotts, and pressures from
108
socially responsible investors, firm managers, and owners. Because
investors are also concerned with the long-term supply of the raw
materials and products used in their business, investors have begun to
pressure firms to control firm suppliers’ operations and activities to
ensure that the raw materials and harvested products will be available
109
for the future.
Supply chain contracts and operations permit anchor firms to
transfer technology and management skills to countries where the
110
rule of law and the regulatory apparatus is weak. When retail firms
are subject to regulatory controls in one jurisdiction but their supply
chain contractors reside in jurisdictions where regulatory standards
either do not exist or are not enforced, the retail firms use contractual
arrangements to ensure that their contractors comply with firm
quality control requirements. While common law or statutory tort or
contract law establishes the regulatory agenda in the jurisdiction of
the anchor firm, these laws have no effect in foreign jurisdictions.
Anchor firms must therefore use contracts to set and enforce the
standards within foreign jurisdictions. In such cases, global supply
chain contracts have been described as “transplanting” social and
111
environmental standards in foreign countries. While the corporate
goal may simply be to meet government, investor, and consumer
demands, a corporation’s exercise of bargaining power and
contractual enforcement benefits the residents of countries in which
environmental and labor regulation has been precluded because of
112
democracy deficits or race to the bottom dynamics.

106. Vandenbergh, supra note 38, at 2031.
107. Vandenbergh, supra note 89, at 947.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 949.
110. See id. at 942–56. In general, these requirements extend only to first-tier suppliers and
would have little impact on suppliers further up the manufacturing chain. Id. As an empirical
matter, countries with strong supply chains also tend to have fair labor practices and improved
environmental performance. See e.g., Thomas P. Lyon & Bart van Hoof, Evaluating Mexico’s
Green Supply Chains Program (2010) (unpublished report to the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation), http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/tplyon/PDF/Working%20Papers/
Lyon%20Van%20Hoof%20GSC%20Paper%20Sep%2013%202010.pdf.
111. Blair et al., supra note 30, at 337–38; see also Li-Wen Lin, Legal Transplants Through
Private Contracting: Codes of Vendor Conduct in Global Supply Chains as an Example, 57 AM.
J. COMP. L. 711, 714–16 (2009); Vandenbergh, supra note 89.
112. Cf. Lin, supra note 111, at 716. (describing how private contracting exports the political
considerations of the “home” country to the country of the supplier). While the low levels of
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3. Voluntary Standards, Certification, and Labeling Systems
Legislative and regulatory bodies may fail to regulate for a
number of reasons despite public demand for regulation. First,
legislative and regulatory bodies may be concerned about conflicting
113
114
policies, and may be uncertain about the impacts of regulation.
115
Second, regulatory authorities may be fragmented or engaged in
116
race to the bottom dynamics. And finally, legislative and regulatory
authorities may also be subject to capture or corruption. A number of
private governance institutions meet the demand for regulation
through alternative structures that resist these hazards.
Private governance institutions are sometimes developed in
situations where legislators face uncertainty about the most efficient

implementation may not yet result in substantial environmental and social benefits, the influx
appears to have prompted the consideration, and in some circumstances, the adoption of certain
legal reforms. Id. at 737 (noting that the ISO 14001 standards have become legal measures in
China).
113. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 57–58 (noting that regulation may be seen as
conflicting with economic growth). For instance, at the international level, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement prohibits trade discrimination
against “like goods.” Vogel, supra note 31, at 161. Governments may post regulations that make
“product distinctions” based on characteristics that inhere in the goods, but they are barred
from making “process distinctions” that relate to the process by which the goods are made.
Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Product/Process Distinction and the
Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 531 (2004). Process distinctions, such
as whether distinctions based on labor standards, human rights conditions, or the environmental
impacts associated with the manufacture and distribution of products, may be challenged as
non-tariff barriers to trade. See Vogel, supra note 31, at 161. If states maintain these kinds of
regulatory standards in the face of a challenge, they may subject the state to retaliatory trade
sanctions. While the law remains somewhat uncertain because cases before the WTO lack
precedential value and because there are a number of exceptions to the doctrine, the product–
process distinction generally bars governments from imposing these kinds of regulatory
standards. There are limits to the reach of the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement,
however. In general, international treaties apply only to the nation–states that are signatories to
the agreements. They do not apply to corporate or individual actors or to multinational
organizations. Nor do they extend to the activities of private parties unless those actions may be
attributed to the states. See David A. Wirth, The International Organization for Standardization:
Private Voluntary Standards as Swords and Shields, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 79, 95 (2009);
Williams, supra note 79, at 481. Consequently, there is an opening for private governance to
meet public demand.
114. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 58 (noting that regulators often lack information,
resources, and technical competence).
115. See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of
Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 49–51 (2003). In such circumstances, agencies vie with one
another for authority. Examples of regulatory fragmentation include authority over regional
land use decisions, control of genetically modified organizations, and control over the release of
toxic substances into the environment under the Toxic Substances Control Act.
116. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 58.
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allocation of entitlements. Voluntary standards, certification, and
117
labeling are institutions that facilitate the operation of “Rule Four,”
as contemplated by Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed in their
seminal article, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability
118
Rules: One View of the Cathedral. These institutions allow parties to
overcome an existing allocation of entitlements through trade by
reducing the transaction costs associated with finding willing buyers
and sellers, coordinating an exchange, negotiating a price, and
119
verifying that the purchased goods are what they claim to be.
While legislators may occasionally allocate entitlements
inefficiently because of uncertainty, an improper allocation of rights
may also occur because of legislative or agency capture. In these
situations, legislators or bureaucrats promulgate regulations that are
120
more favorable to targeted industries than to the public. Regulatory
capture frequently occurs in countries where there are democracy
121
deficits. Voluntary standards, certification, and labeling systems
117. Tracey M. Roberts, The Rise of Rule Four Institutions: Voluntary Standards,
Certification and Labeling Systems (unpublished manuscript, University of Louisville Working
Papers), at 3–5, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1934274.
118. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability Rules: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). In this article,
Calabresi and Melamed summarize certain rules that Calabresi developed in his previous
writings for governments to allocate entitlements in the presence of transaction costs. Id. at
1096–97; see GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (1970). In the case of pollution, legislators must make a choice between two opposing
entitlements: they may grant a firm the right to pollute or grant the public the right to be free of
pollution. Sometimes there is uncertainty about the costs and benefits associated with regulation
and failure to regulate. There may also be uncertainty about the distributional impacts of
regulation versus the status quo. Because of these kinds of uncertainty, an incorrect or
inefficient allocation of entitlements may occur. Under Rule Three, Calabresi and Melamed
suggest that if legislators are uncertain about whether a legal entitlement is worth its cost to
society, they should allocate the costs to the party that will be able to avoid the social cost most
cheaply (the “cheapest cost avoider”). Calabresi & Melamed, supra, at 1096–97. If legislators
are uncertain about which party would be the cheapest cost avoider, they should allocate the
costs to the party that can most cheaply (a) locate the cheapest cost avoider and (b) pay them to
avoid those costs. Id. at 1097. In THE COST OF ACCIDENTS, Calabresi describes this party as
“the best briber.” CALABRESI, supra, at 150.
119. Roberts, supra note 117, at 5–6.
120. Buzbee, supra note 115, at 44–45 (“Most significantly the path-breaking early work of
Professors Stigler, Becker, and Petzman is primarily concerned with how diverse interest groups
will compete for regulatory spoils. The result of this competition is typically not excessively
burdensome regulation addressing social ills, but regulation favoring regulatory targets, weak
regulation or no regulation at all.”). See generally Mancur Olson, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION (1965).
121. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 66–67; Mattli & Woods, supra note 3, at 15 (noting
that a lack of “relative inclusiveness, openness, transparency, fairness, and accessibility of
regulatory institutions” will correlate with regulatory capture); Vogel, supra note 31, at 160 (“It
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avoid capture through a number of structures. First, they frequently
split membership and voting rights into three groups: (1) private firm
or industry representatives, (2) government representatives, officials,
and agencies, and (3) NGOs and other public interest and civic
122
groups. This division allows each interest to participate in the
deliberative process, but limits the power of any one group to
123
124
dominate the institution. Second, decentralization deters capture.
Voluntary standards, certification, and labeling systems employ
substantive rules that reflect broader legal and social norms, and
include structures that provide for transparency and procedural due
process and encourage inclusive and broad participation by various
125
interest groups. Many of these systems permit participation by any
“interested party” and some provide structures and funding to
126
support participation by underrepresented groups.
Even when entitlements have been allocated appropriately and
legislative and administrative bodies have not been captured,
commons dynamics may deter government action in redressing
adverse distributional impacts. Regulatory fragmentation—a split in
government authority over persons, places, or regulatory subject
127
matter—situates agencies in an anti-commons dynamic with respect

is the inability or unwillingness of states to adopt or enforce [government controls over global
firms and markets] that has contributed to the development and growth of non-state-based
governance institutions.”); Vogel, supra note 34, at 266 (“Underlying virtually every scholarly
and popular discussion of global civil regulation is the claim that the global economy suffers
from a democratic governance deficit, often attributed to the constraints posed by global
competitive pressures on the willingness and capacity of states to effectively regulate both
global and domestic firms.”).
122. For example, the Forest Stewardship Council has a global “general assembly” made up
of three chambers—economic, environmental, and social—with equal voting power. Meidinger,
supra note 91, at 523.
123. Id. at 519. Many of these institutions follow the guidelines developed by the ISEAL
Alliance for developing standards, measuring and evaluating performance, and accrediting
auditors. See List of Full Members, ISEAL ALLIANCE, http://www.isealalliance.org/
organisation/full_members (last visited Sept. 17, 2011).
124. See Mattli & Woods, supra note 3, at 11 n.31; Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 79.
125. See Meidinger, supra note 91, at 532–33; see also UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL
DIVERSITY, supra note 54, at 263–64 (noting that when rules have been made by a local elite or
a government agency, research reveals higher levels of theft and free-riding; in contrast, when
those that are governed by the rules have made the rules, participants show increased
cooperation).
126. Meidinger, supra note 91, at 526–27. Some institutions provide resources to permit
low-income individuals and those representing minority interests to participate.
127. See generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); Michael A. Heller, The
Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L. REV. 1163 (1999) (describing the dangers of
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128

to regulatory turf. Examples of regulatory fragmentation include
splits in authority over regional land use decisions between states,
counties, and municipalities, and division of control of genetically
modified organizations between the U.S. Department of Agriculture,
the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Food and Drug
Administration. When multiple agencies are involved in a regulatory
issue, they must communicate, coordinate, and potentially cede
authority to regulate effectively. Transaction costs associated with
communicating and collaborating increase as the number of parties
required for consensus increases. Agencies may resist ceding
authority or sharing information that could undermine that
129
130
authority. The political benefits to an agency from hold-out are
higher than the political rewards of regulation, which are split among
131
the participating agencies. Furthermore, a regulatory breakdown is
less visible and therefore less costly because the public cannot identify
132
any one agency as the source of failure. Voluntary standards,
certification, and labeling mechanisms overcome regulatory
fragmentation by taking the conflict outside of the legal and
regulatory system. These institutions bring all stakeholders together
to resolve issues outside of government venues and without appeal to
133
government authority.
Institutional dynamics may also lead to a tragedy of the
134
135
commons at the regulatory level, creating incentives to deregulate.
Nations, states, counties, and municipalities frequently compete with
one another to attract businesses and new residents. Competition
between these jurisdictions to reduce taxes, exempt industries from
regulation, and provide subsidies may result in a regulatory race to

fragmentation of private property rights and interests). Buzbee extends this analysis to the
fragmentation of regulation over land use and environmental matters. See Buzbee, supra note
115, at 49–51. In such circumstances, agencies refuse to use their authority or spend resources to
regulate because of communication, coordination, and collaboration problems and because the
costs of regulation to the agency outweigh the benefits the agency will receive.
128. See Buzbee, supra note 115, at 49–51.
129. See id. at 50.
130. Hold-out occurs when a necessary party to an agreement withholds consent, stymieing
further progress.
131. See Buzbee, supra note 115, at 33.
132. Id. at 47.
133. Note that frequently there is no government authority to which the stakeholders could
appeal because of democracy deficits at the international level. See Vogel, supra note 34, at 266.
134. See Buzbee, supra note 115, at 49–51 (2003). In such circumstances, agencies vie with
one another for authority.
135. See id. at 26; Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 58.
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136

the bottom. Voluntary standards, certification, and labeling systems
counter the race to the bottom by creating market incentives for
stakeholders to eliminate, reduce, or internalize social costs. These
systems generate countervailing subsidies to encourage stakeholders
to reduce environmental and social harms and promote positive
137
externalities.
Table 2 summarizes the challenges that arise at the negotiation of
standards stage of the regulatory process, the private governance
institutions that address those challenges, what they supply, and the
characteristics private governance institutions must have to be
effective.
Table 2. Standards-Setting Institutions
Barrier or Hazard
Market economics
or competitive
disadvantage

Suppliers
Firm corporate
social responsibility
programs

Structure Supplied
Corporate directive
and internal
structures for
implementation

Keys to Effectiveness
Information about cost
savings
Market for green,
socially responsible
activities
Prescriptive standards
Transparency for
monitoring and
enforcement

136. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 58.
137. For instance, state and local governments often fail to perform regional planning. They
compete for commercial, industrial, and residential developments in order to expand their tax
bases, resulting in a race to the bottom. William W. Buzbee, The Regulatory Fragmentation
Continuum, Westway and the Challenges of Regional Growth, 21 J. L. & POL. 323, 351 (2005).
The consequences include sprawl, traffic, loss of agricultural lands and wildlife habitat to
commercial use, hollowing out of cities, urban blight and brownfields, heat island effects,
groundwater pollution, flooding, and exposure to sewage wastes because of failure to separate
and upgrade storm water infrastructure. In response to these social costs, members of the
design, construction, and development industries; environmental organizations; and urban
planners have developed the U.S. Green Building Council. See U.S. GREEN BUILDING
COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/Default.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2011). The Council addresses
not only issues associated with poor land use planning, but also wasteful building design and
construction practices through its Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED)
standards. The LEED rating system addresses these social costs by rewarding land use planning
that avoids or internalizes these social costs. See Sustainable Sites Requirements, LEED for
New Construction Rating System, in LEED REFERENCE GUIDE FOR GREEN BUILDING
DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION (2009).
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Barrier or Hazard
Regulatory
capture

Suppliers
Voluntary
standards,
certification, and
labeling systems

Structure Supplied
Alternative avenue
for regulation
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Keys to Effectiveness
Tripartite or other
structures to ensure
representation of
different stakeholders
to prevent domination
by one group
Open, transparent
structures to provide
informational access
and avoid secrecy
Deliberative, consensus
structures for inclusive
participation and to
prevent capture by
narrow interests

Misallocation of
entitlements from
uncertainty or
mistake

Democracy
deficits in foreign
jurisdictions

Voluntary
standards,
certification, and
labeling systems

Supply chain
anchors

Structures to reduce
transaction costs in
trade of entitlements
(identification of
parties, negotiation
of price, mechanism
to identify compliant
goods)

Prescriptive standards

Supply standards via
contract (based on
tort law in
jurisdiction of anchor
firm)

Mechanisms to monitor
compliance with
standards

Effective monitors
Protection of label
against dilution,
confusion, and fraud

Mechanisms to enforce
standards, contracts

C. Implementation Facilitators
To the extent firms agree to comply with voluntary regulatory
requirements, they may find the process of implementing the
138
regulations burdensome. Small firms with fewer resources may find

138. In the context of governmental regulation, firms that are the targets of regulation
generally underwrite the costs of implementation and compliance with command-and-control
regulations. These costs may vary widely among firms and are generally higher for older
facilities with older technology, resulting in higher costs per unit of environmental
improvement. These costs of implementation and compliance may also ultimately be passed
forward to consumers or back to suppliers, shareholders, and employees. Governments have
begun to look for more efficient ways to regulate. By shifting to market mechanisms, such as
taxes, subsidies and cap-and-trade programs, governments have permitted the costs of
compliance to be shared among all of the regulatory targets. To reduce these inefficiencies,
governments have begun to incorporate a number of innovations developed by private
governance institutions to reduce costs and accelerate the speed of adoption and
implementation of new standards. These innovations are often referred to as the “new
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the process prohibitively expensive. A number of private governance
mechanisms have arisen to facilitate implementation of regulatory
standards and lower the costs of compliance. These include models
and meta-standards, learning initiatives, environmental management
systems, and codes of conduct. These institutions reduce costs
associated with compliance with both governmental and private
standards and address market uncertainties that may impact
voluntary efforts to internalize externalities.
1. Models and Meta-Standards
A number of institutions have arisen to assist in the development
of private governance by creating model structures and outlining
procedures and criteria for the development of standards (“models”
and “meta-standards”). Models, such as ISO 14001, provide general
139
templates for firms to develop environmental management systems.
Models permit firms to implement these systems without having to
construct the systems from scratch. The models thereby lower cost
barriers and accelerate implementation of rules and structures. To the
extent models provide guidelines for data collection and
documentation, they also permit those concerned with compliance to
compare the records of different firms or organizations. Metastandards (rules for setting rules) such as those developed by the
140
ISEAL Alliance for voluntary standards, certification, and labeling
governance.” To increase adoption and implementation of standards, they have also begun to
include managerial style mechanisms. Pattberg, supra note 46. These include providing nonmandatory guidelines and protocols; requiring firms to develop management plans, set
benchmarks for performance, and use various metrics for measuring progress; and requesting
that the firms share best practices with other regulated parties. See, e.g., Trubek & Trubek,
supra note 27, at 555–57 (describing the European Water Development Framework and related
Common Implementation Strategy). These mechanisms foster innovation, increase flexibility,
and improve participation. Id.
139. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has expanded its role as a
standards-setting institution for products and has begun to provide models for management
systems, including environmental management systems. See, e.g., ISO 9000: Quality
Management,
ISO:
INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION
FOR
STANDARDIZATION,
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/management_and_leadership_standards/quality_managem
ent.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2011).
140. For example, the ISEAL Alliance provides guidance and models for voluntary
standards, certification and labeling mechanisms. The organization shares best practices to help
member organizations improve their effectiveness, increase their positive impacts, and maintain
their credibility. See The ISEAL Alliance in 100 Words, ISEAL ALLIANCE,
http://www.isealalliance.org/content/the-iseal-alliance-in-100-words (last visited Sept. 29, 2011).
ISEAL Alliance establishes process requirements by which organizations develop, structure,
and revise standards that provide for the process to be open, transparent, and broadly
participatory.
See
ISEAL
Codes
of
Good
Practices,
ISEAL
ALLIANCE,
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systems, provide guidance about how to develop effective rules and
regulatory structures. These institutions reduce the costs of
developing effective regulatory rules and structures by providing
models, disseminating information about best practices, and
providing a locus for their members to share information.
Without models and meta-standards, the development of private
governance institutions would be more expensive and less effective.
Stakeholders would be forced to generate rules themselves or modify
rules and structures from other industries. Models and metastandards also improve regulatory effectiveness. If standards fail to be
sufficiently prescriptive or to include appropriate metrics for
141
measuring improvement, the process of promulgating the standards
142
may be seen as purely symbolic, increasing costs without procuring
actual changes in social and environmental conditions. By identifying
best practices to address the needs of particular industries, sectors,
and stakeholders, models and meta-standards accelerate learning and
facilitate institutional effectiveness.
2. Learning Initiatives
Learning initiatives are programs designed to increase capacity
within a firm to evaluate and improve social and environmental
143
performance.
Learning initiatives provide training to firm
employees to facilitate the development and operation of

http://www.isealalliance.org/content/codes-good-practice (last visited Sept 29, 2011). The
organization also sets standards for measuring and evaluating the social and environmental
impacts of the member organizations and the effectiveness of their systems. Id. Finally, the
organization has accreditation and process requirements for the individuals or bodies that will
audit and certify whether participants are in compliance with the organization’s standards with a
view to ensuring that they are credible and accessible. See id. ISEAL Alliance provides training,
tools, and technical support to its members. Members, ISEAL ALLIANCE, http://www.ise
alalliance.org/content/members (last visited Sept. 29, 2011). The ISEAL Alliance follows its own
guidelines and procedures in setting standards for its member organizations. Code Development,
ISEAL ALLIANCE, http://www.isealalliance.org/content/
code-development (last visited Sept. 29, 2011).
141. See Courville, supra note 61, at 280. Without concrete performance benchmarks, it is
difficult to measure whether a firm is improving over time or to make comparisons to other
firms, which impacts the credibility of the system. Id. at 283.
142. Id. at 287–88; Andrew King et al., The Strategic Use of Decentralized Institutions:
Exploring Certification with ISO 14001 Management Standard, 48 ACAD. MGMT J. 1091, 1092–
94 (2005).
143. See Courville, supra note 61, at 273–74. For example, the Ethical Trading Initiative
assists firms in adopting management and reporting systems associated with labor practices and
facilitates dispute resolution. Training, ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE, http://www.ethical
trade.org/training (last visited Jan. 19, 2012).
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144

accountability, auditing, and reporting systems. Firms generally
participate in learning initiatives to receive reputational benefits and
to reduce risks associated with name and shame campaigns, tort
actions, labor disputes, and other events that reduce firm profitability.
Firms may also be motivated to enroll in these programs to improve
employee relationships and align their practices with the norms and
145
values of senior management. Firms sometimes enroll in learning
initiatives to receive reputational benefits, but fail to achieve
146
compliance after enrolling in the program.
3. Environmental Management Systems
Firms have employed management systems for many years to
147
improve firm operations and efficiency. More recently, firms have
144. Id. at 273. The primary non-governmental example of a learning initiative is the
Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI). See generally ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE,
http://www.ethicaltrade.org (last visited Oct. 8, 2011). ETI targets supply chains to improve
labor practices throughout the world. About ETI, ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE,
http://www.ethicaltrade.org/about-eti (last visited Oct. 8, 2011). The organization’s membership
is comprised of firms, trade union organizations, and nonprofit organizations or voluntary civic
institutions. Our Members, ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE, http://www.ethicaltrade.org/abouteti/our-members (last visited Oct. 8, 2011). ETI helps firms evaluate their trade performance
and set benchmarks to improve their performance over time. What We Do, ETHICAL TRADING
INITIATIVE, http://www.ethicaltrade.org/about-eti/what-we-do (last visited Oct. 8, 2011). The
organization identifies best practices, provides training on implementation of those practices,
initiates pilot projects, and brokers resolutions between companies, suppliers, and workers. Id.
The organization also raises awareness among consumers, and provides training to firms on
integrating ethical buying practices. Id. Finally, ETI requires firms to submit annual reports of
their progress and conducts random validation visits to approximately twenty percent of its
membership each year to validate the data and information contained in the report. What
Companies Sign Up To, ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE, http://www.ethicaltrade.org/abouteti/what-companies-sign-up-to (last visited Jan. 19, 2012). The organization provides a
disciplinary procedure for companies that fail to implement the management systems and data
collection processes within the benchmarked timeframes. The ultimate sanction is removal from
the organization’s membership list. ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE, PROCEDURE TO ENFORCE
MEMBERSHIP OBLIGATION: CORPORATE MEMBERS (2009), available at http://www.ethical
trade.org/resources/key-eti-resources/eti-disciplinary-procedure. The organization is supported
through membership fees and grants from government agencies. Firms join the organization to
benefit from the support structures and mediation processes to reduce the risk of strikes and
work stoppage and to rehabilitate their reputations following adverse media exposure. Join ETI,
ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE, http://www.ethicaltrade.org/get-involved/join-eti (last visited
Jan. 19, 2012).
145. Courville, supra note 61, at 271.
146. See id. at 274.
147. See, e.g., ISO 9001: 2008, ISO: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR
STANDARDIZATION,
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/management_and_leadership_
standards/quality_management/iso_9001_2008.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2012); PHILIP B.
CROSBY, LET’S TALK QUALITY: 96 QUESTIONS YOU ALWAYS WANTED TO ASK PHIL CROSBY
(1989); KAORU ISHIKAWA, WHAT IS TOTAL QUALITY CONTROL? (David J. Lu trans., 1985).
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begun to employ environmental management systems that focus
specifically on firm environmental performance and the impacts of
148
firm operations. The systems may include evaluation processes to
determine the environmental impacts of a firm’s operations, policies
designed to reduce those environmental impacts, plans for allocating
resources and responsibility for implementing those policies,
timelines for implementation, and organizational structures and
hierarchies to assign responsibility for evaluating and reporting
compliance. The systems help firms identify environmental problems
149
and build capacity for change. The systems may, but do not
necessarily, provide specific goals for the firm to accomplish,
benchmarks to measure progress in meeting those goals, and
timelines for meeting those benchmarks and tracking improvement.
Firms may develop their own systems or they may reduce the time
and resources that they must invest by using models and metastandards, which identify programs and processes that have already
150
been tried, tested, and distilled into best practices. Environmental
management systems also facilitate the inculcation of values and a
151
shift in firm norms through the logic of appropriateness.
Because each firm may develop its own standards, environmental
management systems are thought to lower the barriers to entry to
environmental improvement, thereby increasing participation in the
systems. By stressing continual improvement, the systems are thought
148. For example, ISO 14001 provides a standardized set of guidelines that firms may
follow in instituting an environmental management system. ISO 14001:2004 provides a general
template for developing an environmental management system for use by all firms. This meets
the ISO’s organizational goal—to standardize systems, to increase interoperability, to reduce
the cost of obtaining knowledge, and to assure those that rely on the system that the essential
elements of environmental management have been considered and addressed. Because the
operations of businesses differ from one another, their environmental impacts vary. For this
reason, ISO has provided a general template that may be modified by each business based on
their initial evaluation of their environmental impacts. See ISO 14000 Essentials, ISO:
INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION
FOR
STANDARDIZATION,
http://www.iso.org/iso/
iso_catalogue/management_and_leadership_standards/environmental_management/iso_14000_
essentials.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2011).
149. See Courville, supra note 61, at 288.
150. Auld et al., supra note 9, at 422.
151. Young, Institutions and Environmental Change, supra note 56, at 7; see also Vogel,
supra note 31, at 170 (describing norm-shifting and a “herd effect” to the decision to adopt
voluntary standards); Stephen Bernstein & Benjamin Cashore, Can Non-State Global
Governance be Legitimate?: An Analytical Framework, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 347, 349–50
(2007) (explaining that social systems provide a basis for understanding what institutional goals
are worthwhile and justified, what institutional structures are legitimate, and what actions are
appropriate or inappropriate, and that certain private governance systems may be a source of
change for existing rules and norms).
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to incentivize firms at all levels to improve their level of
environmental performance, but this encourages firms to set their
initial standards low so that they will be able to demonstrate
152
continual improvement over time.
Furthermore, because
compliance is costly, firms have an incentive to avoid setting
153
prescriptive requirements and specific benchmarks. Consequently,
the employment of environmental management systems may obscure
154
the fact that the changes firms are making are minor.
4. Codes of Conduct
In general, codes of conduct are developed by members of an
155
industry to reduce risk in industry operations. When the members

152. King et al., supra note 142, at 1101.
153. See Courville, supra note 61, at 288–89. Prescriptive requirements might include
maximum emissions during a set time frame. Procedural requirements, in contrast, might
include plans to take measurements at set intervals and to report them to firm management
using specific forms of communication.
154. Auld et al., supra note 9, at 422–23.
155. See, e.g., Auld et al., supra note 9, at 423 (discussing the Equator Principles). The
Equator Principles were developed in 2003 by a number of private banking firms, including
Citigroup, ABN Amro, and Barclays. History of the Equator Principles, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES,
http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/about-the-equator-principles/38-about/about/17
(last visited Oct. 8, 2011). The project sets industry-wide social and environmental standards for
project finance, applying across all industry sectors to projects with capital costs in excess of $10
million. About the Equator Principles, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, http://www.equatorprinciples.com/index.php/about-the-equator-principles (last visited Oct. 8, 2011). The standards
are based, in part, on the social and environmental sustainability performance standards
developed by the International Finance Corporation and on the World Bank’s Environmental,
Health, and Safety general guidelines. Id. Project developers are required to avoid, reduce,
mitigate, or provide restitution for the negative impacts of their projects on ecosystems and
communities. Id. In July 2010 an association was created to govern the institution; the
organization is comprised of participating financial institutions that are active in public finance
and have adopted the principles and associates (banking institutions that are not active in public
finance). The Equator Principles Association, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, http://www.equatorprinciples.com/index.php/about-the-equator-principles/38-about/about/12 (last visited Oct. 8,
2011). The association obtains input from various steering committees and working groups,
including three stakeholder engagement working groups comprised of NGOs, industry-based
groups, and SRI firms. About the Equator Principles, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES,
http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/about-the-equator-principles (last visited Oct. 8,
2011). Signatories are required to report annually on their lending activities. Reporting
Requirements, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/membersreporting/reporting-requirements (last visited Oct. 8, 2011). At times, NGOs have raised
questions about the degree to which signatory banks have enforced the Equator Principles and
held project developers accountable. See, e.g., WWF Urges Commercial Banks Not to Fund
Controversial Pipeline, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND (Nov. 11, 2003), http://wwf.panda.org/
wwf_news/press_releases/?9722/WWF-urges-commercial-banks-not-to-fund-controversialpipeline. While this code of conduct has extended to lenders, the main risks here are from
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of an industry share a collective reputation, all industry members are
156
exposed to economic harm when one member causes injury. Codes
of conduct encourage industry members to undertake similar
obligations, thereby reducing the competitive disadvantage faced by
any one firm that is subject to the regulatory standards of a particular
jurisdiction or the costs of complying with differing standards in
multiple jurisdictions. In a voluntary context in which no public
regulation has been developed, codes of conduct facilitate voluntary
adoption of industry standards by reducing the competitive risks
associated with implementing labor and working condition standards,
paying fair wages or fair prices for commodities, adopting new
technologies or limits to prevent over-harvesting or environmental
harms. The more firms that participate in a voluntary regulatory
program, the less competitive disadvantage any single firm faces from
incurring the costs associated with complying with that program.
Similarly, in the context of existing regulation, codes of conduct
may facilitate standards implementation by reducing leakage. Even
where regulatory standards have been imposed and are properly
enforced, compliant firms face a competitive disadvantage from firms
157
that flee a jurisdiction to avoid the costs associated with regulation.
When production and supply networks cross jurisdictional
boundaries, it becomes more difficult for governments to enforce
158
standards.
Firms may avoid the costs of compliance by
subcontracting to other companies, by outsourcing risky behavior to
159
companies that do not meet size or jurisdictional thresholds, and by
entering into private contracts that mandate conditions that skirt the
160
technical parameters of existing regulations.
Codes of conduct are usually funded solely by industry or
industry trade groups and are developed by industry without input
from other stakeholders, such as potentially impacted parties,
regulators, or the general public. Consequently, they may not contain
prescriptive requirements that would improve environmental or
social outcomes. In fact, they may not supply effective regulatory
leakage—companies turning to other lenders, such as sovereign wealth funds, that do not
require these kinds of criteria.
156. Auld et al., supra note 9, at 423.
157. In a related practice, firms sometimes create subsidiaries outside of the regulating
jurisdiction and execute a subcontract with that entity to outsource the offending activity.
Vandenbergh, supra note 38, at 2034.
158. See Vogel, supra note 31, at 159–60.
159. Vandenbergh, supra note 38, at 2088.
160. Id.
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standards at all. Frequently, codes of conduct lack structures for
161
implementation or procedures for monitoring and enforcement. In
general, firms have an incentive to enjoy the advantages of the
appearance of improvement without making any actual effort to
improve. Unless there are effective monitoring and enforcement
systems in place to ensure compliance, the regime may be marked by
significant free-riding; this incentive grows as the number of members
162
in the industry group increases.
5. Voluntary Standards, Certification, and Labeling Systems
Voluntary standards, certification, and labeling systems provide a
number of resources to facilitate implementation of social and
environmental standards. They train and accredit consultants to
advise participants in the certification process on program
requirements and to provide technical assistance to firms in
implementing management systems. They also market the standards
and label products, firms, and facilities for consumers to generate
premium prices that incentivize and reward firms to adopt the
standards and implement the certification process.
Table 3 summarizes the challenges that arise at the
implementation stage, the structures institutions supply to address
those challenges, and the characteristics needed be effective at that
stage.
Table 3. Implementation Facilitators
Barrier or Hazard
Market
uncertainties

Suppliers
Models and
meta-standards

Costs of
implementation

Structure Supplied
Reduce costs by
providing
templates, best
practices

Keys to Effectiveness
General models have
greater interoperability;
particularized models have
better application to
specific problems
Requirement of
prescriptive standards

161. Auld et al., supra note 9, at 423.
162. Lyon, supra note 3, at 59.
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Barrier or Hazard
Costs of
implementation

Suppliers
Learning
initiatives

Structure Supplied
Reduce costs by
providing technical
support for
implementation
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Keys to Effectiveness
Knowledge of industry and
industry practices
Feedback mechanism for
best practices
Mechanism to verify
implementation

Costs of
implementation

Environmental
management
systems

Systematizes
implementation

Prescriptive standards
Monitoring
Transparency

Competitive
disadvantage from
acting alone

Codes of
conduct

Levels the playing
field for
participants in
industry

Prescriptive standards for
club membership
Monitoring is necessary to
prevent free-riding
Enforcement against freeriders

Market
uncertainties

Socially
responsible
investment
Voluntary
standards,
certification,
and labeling
institutions

Costs of
implementation

Voluntary
standards,
certification,
and labeling
institutions

Market incentives
through price
premiums to induce
parties to
participate

Marketing to consumers
and investors
Sufficiently broad
consumer or investor
participation for market
incentive to be created
Ability to exclude
noncompliant parties from
club

Provides technical
assistance,
management
systems, and trains
consultants to
advise participants
on program
requirements and
implementation

Prescriptive standards must
be clearly delineated
Complementary monitoring
and enforcement devices
are needed to ensure
compliance

D. Monitoring
A demand for private governance at the monitoring stage arises
when governments have failed to create adequate requirements for
monitoring, when too few funds are allocated to develop the
infrastructure required for monitoring, and when corruption or other
factors render monitoring ineffective. An economic model of the
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deterrence effect of sanctions predicts that parties will comply with
regulation to the extent that the penalties for noncompliance, when
multiplied by the risk of getting caught, exceed the benefits from
163
cheating. In other words, the efforts a firm will make and the funds
the firm will invest to comply with regulations depend on the risk of
getting caught cheating, the benefits to be gained from cheating, the
164
penalty for cheating, and the benefits of compliance. The higher the
risks and costs of noncompliance and the higher the benefits of
compliance, the more likely a party is to adhere to the rules. This
suggests four options to improve compliance with the rules: (1)
increase the likelihood of detecting cheating, (2) reduce the benefits
from cheating, (3) increase the sanctions against cheaters, and (4)
increase the rewards for compliance. Private governance institutions
have taken all four approaches. The first and second options are
discussed in this section and the third and fourth options are
discussed in section E infra.
Most businesses have focused on option one, increasing the
likelihood of detecting cheaters either by paying for monitoring,
providing infrastructure to improve monitoring, or expanding the
number of monitors. However, cooperatives have employed option
three, reducing the benefits of cheating by eliminating the principal–
agent problem.
1. Contractual Approaches
Much environmental and labor regulatory compliance may be
165
attributed to contractual arrangements between private parties.
Equity investors condition their investment of capital, lenders
163. JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 128–38 (2005). From an
economic point of view, firms would comply with regulations when the value to be gained from
cheating is less than the amount of penalty multiplied by the risk of getting caught out of
compliance. If the penalty multiplied by the risk of getting caught is greater than the value of
cheating, then a firm will comply with the regulations. However, if the costs of monitoring are
high, such as when there are many sources of environmental harm, then monitoring will not
occur as frequently. If monitoring is done less frequently or less comprehensively, the risk of
getting caught is low and firms will be incentivized to cheat.
164. See Williams, supra note 79, at 493 (citing Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968)). This analysis derives from the “logic of
consequences” used primarily in law, economics, and political science. Sociology would
interpret compliance activities somewhat differently, from the “logic of appropriateness” where
compliance activities communicate to shareholders, future investors, lenders, insurers,
regulators, and the general public a commitment that is inculcated through socialization into a
shared culture. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 63–64 (describing how the ANIME
framework can accommodate both the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences).
165. See Vandenbergh, supra note 38, at 2034.
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166

condition their lending, and insurance companies condition their
commitment to insure on the outcome of their due diligence or
underwriting investigations. In general, investors, acquisition parties,
lenders, and insurers all identify their risks of loss by performing
preliminary investigations. As an alternative, or in conjunction with
these investigations, investors, purchasers, lenders, and insurers may
also require that the counterparty make representations and
warranties about past activity and make covenants promising to
undertake certain beneficial actions and to avoid actions that would
increase risks during the term of the contract. The counterparty
discloses in a set of schedules all of the known risks and costs that the
investors, purchasers, lenders, and insurers identify as areas of
concern.
In the context of an acquisition or investment, the risks and costs
that the acquisition target identifies may be reflected in a lower
purchase price, in post-closing agreements, in indemnity provisions,
167
and in insurance products covering post-closing risks. These kinds
of contractual arrangements enhance efficiency by permitting the
parties to allocate those burdens to the parties most likely to manage
168
those costs most effectively and cheaply. They also incentivize firms
seeking debt or equity investments to reduce sources of risk before
seeking capital.
Lenders may include provisions in their loan documents that
grant the lender private rights of enforcement when environmental
problems or risks such as labor strikes or work stoppages arise; in
doing so, lenders add themselves to the number of parties monitoring
169
compliance. While lenders may have added these provisions to their
loan agreements primarily to provide lenders with a counterclaim in
170
the context of potential regulatory liability, lender imposition of a
166. Id. at 2051–56.
167. Id. at 2046–47.
168. See id. at 2050. In addition, private dispute resolution mechanisms in the contracts
permit parties to preserve confidentiality and to avoid costs associated with court delays and
unreliability. Id. at 2051.
169. Id. at 2053.
170. Following the imposition of liability against a lender for environmental torts under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006), in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir.
1990), lenders began to perform more extensive due diligence to remain within the safe harbor
regulations promulgated by the EPA and to include additional contractual provisions to provide
additional defenses against liability. William G. Murray, What to Do About the Problem Project,
SS049 ALI-ABA 121, 135–36 (2011) (outlining the history of lender liability for environmental
contamination and the subsequent development of guidance by the EPA to allow lenders to
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Phase I Environmental Report, for example, in the standard
underwriting process may not only have availed lenders of the safe
harbor rules and a number of defenses under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
171
172
(CERCLA), but also improved environmental management.
Insurers perform due diligence investigations to determine the
risk profile of the insured. Insurers set rates and identify exclusions
from coverage based on what they uncover, and they may offer
incentives, such as lower premiums, for safe operations and actions
that reduce risk. Insurers may also mandate that the insured employ
certain equipment or implement certain procedures prior to granting
coverage. Finally, insurance companies may conduct inspections to
verify whether the matters a firm has reported are correct.
2. Audits and Third Party Assurance Services
Third-party auditing processes arose initially as an extension of
173
the financial audits that accounting firms performed. Globalized
firms now outsource manufacturing processes and other services to
174
foreign firms. Products have also grown more complex; supply firms
manufacture components in different countries, making it more
difficult to monitor and control quality, conformity to specifications,
175
and timely delivery. Because manufacturing standards, regulatory
infrastructure, and cultural practices differ throughout the world,
firms now hire third-party auditors to verify whether goods
manufactured by foreign contractors meet the contracting firm’s
176
specifications.

avail themselves of safe harbors and employ other defenses under CERCLA by undertaking
“all appropriate inquiries” including a Phase I Environmental Site Assessment before taking
title through a foreclosure action).
171. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675.
172. Recently Brazil has expanded their rules for environmental liability to include lenders
in the array of potentially responsible parties in an apparent attempt to use lender due diligence
and monitoring as a mechanism to enforce environmental laws and to substitute for an
ineffective public administration regime. See Bianca Zambao, Brazil’s Launch of Lender
Environmental Liability as a Tool to Manage Environmental Impacts, 18 U. MIAMI INT’L COMP.
L. REV 47 (2010).
173. Blair et al., supra note 30, at 330.
174. Id. at 329, 335.
175. See id. at 329.
176. Id. Social, cultural, and institutional differences and geographic distance reduce the
frequency of interaction and information transfers, impacting accuracy of the information flows.
See King et al., supra note 142, at 1093, 1096.
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Third-party audits have expanded to include social parameters
relating to labor standards, environmental impacts, and other
177
matters. As firms have begun to expand into new markets for
environmentally friendly or socially responsible goods or services,
they have begun making claims that they have taken effective actions
to reduce their negative environmental or social impacts, or that their
products are better for the environment than comparable products.
Frequently, in response to environmental NGO accusations that firms
are misrepresenting their green credentials or greenwashing their
environmental performance, these firms have begun to employ third178
party audits to prove their environmental claims are true. Social
audits verify whether or not a firm or facility is adhering to pledges it
has made to follow certain production processes, use certain
management systems, or otherwise meet the benchmarks or
environmental or social standards to which it has committed. Social
audits may be aimed at firm products, facilities, services, or
179
processes. They may include performance assessments to determine
whether production standards have been met, or may simply verify
180
whether a firm is following prescribed processes. Companies may
hire either private firms, including the accounting firms that are
181
182
performing other auditing services, civic organizations, or some
hybrid to perform the audits. Some institutions set guidelines and
provide training for auditors to ensure that firm performance is
183
accurately measured.
184
As auditing has grown into a separate industry, private
185
commercial auditors have sometimes been criticized as ineffective.
Conflicts of interest arise when the party being audited pays for the
186
audit. Consequently, some private governance institutions require

177. Courville, supra note 61, at 272; Blair et al., supra note 30, at 329, 337.
178. Courville, supra note 61, at 271–72 (noting that studies have shown that false
environmental claims are widespread).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Blair et al., supra note 30, at 345. Major accounting firms are responsible for providing
sixty percent of the reports where firms seek third-party verification.
182. Courville, supra note 61, at 272.
183. See id. at 276–77.
184. Blair et al., supra note 30, at 342.
185. Michael J. Hiscox et al., Evaluating the Impact of SA 8000 Certification, in SA 8000:
THE FIRST DECADE 147–48 (Deborah Leipziger ed., 2008).
186. See Courville, supra note 61, at 275 (noting that financial relationships can weaken
auditor independence).
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the party closest to the consumer in the supply chain pay for the
187
In addition, stakeholders question whether monitoring
audit.
agencies are sufficiently independent so as to fairly assess compliance
when these same monitoring agencies are paid by their regulatory
targets, are hired to assist with implementation, or are imbedded in
188
the organizations that set the standards. To maintain legitimacy, a
number of these institutions have separated the standards-setting and
implementation activity from the monitoring functions by transferring
189
those functions to newly created organizations or business entities.
This practice eliminates the potential conflict of interest that may
arise when monitors also set and improve standards or have business
190
interests in standards implementation assistance.
Some scholars have suggested that the enforcement of
environmental and social provisions would be improved through
widespread adoption of more explicit and effective standards and by
disclosure of existing implementation and enforcement practices,
possibly through a clearinghouse relating to supply contracts that
would include detailed information about firm supplier procurement
policies, environmental provisions in the contracts, other materials
about implementation, and the extent of enforcement by the supply
191
chain anchor or retailer. These changes would expand the number
of monitors by permitting consumers and NGOs to evaluate firm and
192
supply chain performance.
However, firms are unlikely to
voluntarily share such information because it would reduce their
competitiveness generally.
3. Voluntary Standards, Certification, and Labeling Systems
In general, consumers concerned with the environmental impacts
of goods they consider buying can seldom discern whether the goods
were produced sustainably and without use of toxins just by

187. For example, the Fairtrade Labeling Organization solves this problem in a unique way
by charging the final packaging company in the supply chain a license fee to pay for the cost of
the auditing process. Id. This allocates the audit costs to the entity in the supply chain that is
closest to the consumer—the party that most values the audit. While the actual cost of the audit
may ultimately be passed forward or backward (through higher coffee prices to consumers or
reduced prices for farmers) based on market dynamics, it solves the conflict of interest
dilemmas that arise from producers paying directly for their own audits.
188. Id. at 283.
189. Id. at 287–88.
190. Id. at 283.
191. Vandenbergh, supra note 89, at 967.
192. See id. at 969.
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examining the goods. Similarly, consumers concerned about the social
conditions under which goods were manufactured or produced cannot
tell through inspection whether the goods were produced under
hazardous or unfair working conditions, traded under monopolistic
193
terms, or extracted at the cost of human life. When a consumer
cannot discern the quality of the good before, during, or after use,
194
those goods are known as “credence goods.” Consumer criteria
relating to environmental sustainability and social impacts are
195
credence qualities. Credence goods create monitoring and selection
196
problems.
Because the goods are credence goods, consumers and investors
have difficulty identifying the goods that meet their preferences. In
these situations investors and consumers must generally rely on the
197
reputation or assurances of other parties.
SRI firms screen
investments to meet investor standards. Voluntary standards,
certification, and labeling systems create structures to ensure that a
firm, facility, or set of goods complies with and conforms to their
198
standards. These systems solve the monitoring problem by training
and accrediting monitors and by requiring all products, facilities, or
firms that receive the certification label to go through a process in
which their activities are monitored to ensure that they conform to
the standards. To the extent monitors fail to apply standards
uniformly, they are subject to negative reputational costs and may be
subject to having their accreditation revoked. Voluntary standards,
certification, and labeling systems assist consumers in differentiating
199
and selecting compliant goods by labeling them.
193. Whether or not resources have been extracted as a result of exploitative practices or a
product has been manufactured using slave labor, and whether these items are transferred up
the supply chain for less than their fair market value because of the exercise of power, is not
visible to the consumer.
194. Darby & Karni, supra note 87, at 68–69 (“Credence qualities are those which, although
worthwhile, cannot be evaluated in normal use. Instead the assessment of their value requires
additional costly information.”).
195. Ostensibly, consumers with concerns about the presence of toxins may detect them
through chemical testing processes, but such tests can be exorbitantly expensive and are not
readily available.
196. King et al., supra note 142, at 1092.
197. See Darby & Karni, supra note 87, at 69 (discussing the issue in the context of repair
services, where consumers often must rely on the claims of the service provider).
198. See Vogel, supra note 31, at 183.
199. For example, the Forest Stewardship Council certifies and labels forest products so
that consumers may avoid illegally and unsustainably harvested wood and instead choose
products that have been sustainably harvested. Similarly, the Marine Stewardship Council,
through their certification and labeling of fish and marine products, seeks to increase consumer
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4. Disclosure and Reporting Initiatives
Disclosure and reporting initiatives increase the risks to
noncompliant firms of getting caught by expanding the number of
monitors. They recruit firms to self-report information about their
200
activities across a range of social and environmental parameters.
Reporting initiatives multiply the effects of both governmental
regulation and private governance by increasing the number of
monitors and by rewarding firms with positive recognition and
reputational benefits for reducing the negative impacts of the
201
manufacture and distribution processes. Reporting initiatives also
202
shift public norms, including management norms,
facilitate
203
environmental activism, and signal investment choices for socially
responsible investors and underwriting choices for insurance
204
companies. By providing more information about whether firms are

awareness about illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing and shift consumption toward
more sustainable harvesting.
200. The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is one of the most well-known of these types of
programs. CERES, a nonprofit organization created following the Exxon Valdez oil spill,
partnered with the United Nations Environmental Programme to develop a corporate code of
conduct–the CERES principles–to be used by private investors in evaluating firm performance.
These principles and their reporting requirements later developed into the GRI. Pattberg, supra
note 138, at 598–602. The GRI is a network-based organization that has developed a
sustainability reporting framework that reduces the transaction costs firms face in gathering and
reporting information relating to the environmental and social impacts of their operations. The
framework helps firms determine what to report and how to gather reliable, high-quality data
about their operations, and facilitates the compilation of credible, consistent reports that permit
investors to compare firms. See generally GRI, http://www.globalreporting.org/Home (last
visited Sept. 17, 2011).
201. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China Problem, 81 S. CAL. L. REV.
905, 943 (2008).
202. Vogel, supra note 34, at 269 (“The literature . . . frequently claims that business
acceptance of [corporate social responsibility] in general and civil regulation in particular both
reflect and reinforce a shift in norms for acceptable global business behavior.”); see also
Pattberg, supra note 46, at 598–602 (describing development of the GRI as arising, in part, from
demands of investors seeking information about risks associated with companies’ environmental
performance and the subsequent responsiveness of firms in participating in the GRI to secure
brand reputation and profits amidst a hostile public environment following the Exxon Valdez
oil spill).
203. See id. at 955.
204. See id. at 956. Formal government has also employed periodic reporting and
transparency requirements to facilitate surveillance by multiple parties, including the general
public. Vandenbergh, supra note 38, at 2072. Mandatory public disclosure requirements—such
as those in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6929–6939
(2006), the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§
11021–11023 (2006), and the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 13106 (2006), which
are reported in the Toxic Release Inventory—have been effective in shifting firms to reduce
their environmental impacts. The Toxic Release Inventory, established shortly after the 1984
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performing across a range of environmental and social parameters,
disclosure and reporting initiatives educate the public about risks,
permit investors to make socially conscious decisions about their
investments, permit consumers to make thoughtful choices about
their purchases, and permit regulators, insurance companies, and
other interested parties to compare risks between firms.
Monitoring the supply of credence goods is inherently
problematic. Where voluntary standards, certification, and labeling
systems face difficulties in verifying that goods are legally harvested,
organic, traded fairly, produced in a sustainable, ecosystem-friendly
manner, investors face similar difficulties in discerning whether their
investments are supporting their investment goals. Consequently, to
the extent that any of these private governance institutions rely on
self-reported information from firms without employing a monitoring
or verification system, private governance institutions have no way to
tell whether the reports are accurate. However, by affirmatively
reporting firm activities, practices, and other performance metrics,
firms invite additional scrutiny by employees, investors, consumers,
concerned public interest groups, the news media, and the markets.
Economic modeling suggests that firm participation in reporting
initiatives will be low compared to participation under mandatory
government disclosure programs, particularly among the firms that
205
perform most poorly along the reported parameters. However,
when compared to situations in which there is no clear governing
authority and where government has failed to act, any movement by
firms to address social costs can improve outcomes, particularly when
206
the risks associated with inaction are high. In addition, movement
Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal India, has been seen as particularly effective. It requires large
industrial firms to disclose information to the public each year about chemical releases that have
occurred at their facilities. Vandenbergh, supra note 201, at 943–44. Empirical studies have
shown that markets have responded to this information by penalizing the highest emitters with
reductions in stock value. Id. As a consequence, high-emitting firms reduced their emissions
more rapidly and to a greater extent than lower-emitting companies, even when emissions
reductions were not required by law. Id.
205. Lyon, supra note 3, at 61 (discussing incentives for firm to disclose or to avoid
disclosure).
206. For instance, in response to the risks associated with climate change, nearly 3000 of the
largest corporations submitted voluntary reports in 2009 on their carbon emissions to the
Carbon Disclosure Project, which provides the information to over 500 institutional investors,
with over $71 trillion in assets under management, and approximately 60 supply chain anchors,
such as Wal-Mart. What We Do: Overview, CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT,
https://www.cdproject.net/en-US/WhatWeDo/Pages/overview.aspx (last visited Nov. 21, 2011).
The data is also available to policymakers, government bodies, NGOs, universities, and the
general public. The Carbon Disclosure Project was developed to identify the financial risks
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toward disclosure by a few firms could eventually lead to the
development of industry-wide codes of conduct that would shift
adoption and implementation rates upward.
5. Environmental Management Systems
Firms employing environmental management systems generally
207
use internal control systems to monitor firm performance. These
firms may supplement internal audits with external auditing,
208
disclosure, and reporting programs. Environmental management
systems also generally provide a framework for generating
documentation to demonstrate compliance. To the extent that a firm
discloses this information to the public, the report may be used to
provide assurance to employees, customers, and the general public
about risk, safety, and environmental performance, to confirm with
investors, lenders, and suppliers that the firm is operating in
conformity with their requirements, and to show regulatory agencies
that the firm is in compliance with the law. Environmental
management systems may therefore reduce the frequency and costs of
209
external monitoring by government regulators. To the extent that

companies face from climate change and companies’ efforts to decrease carbon emissions, with
the understanding that in the business world “what gets measured gets managed.” Blair et al.,
supra note 30, at 345; Industry Viewpoints: What Does Business Want from a Global Deal?,
CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, https://www.cdproject.net/en-us/WhatWeDo/Pages/Industryviewpoints-What-does-business-want-from-a-Global-Deal.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2011).
Nevertheless, if reporting initiatives only require firms to self-report and lack systems to verify
whether the reports correctly reflect the firm environmental impacts, their usefulness to
investors and consumers may be limited.
207. See Courville, supra note 61, at 288.
208. Id. In addition to mandatory governmental programs and due diligence and
compliance information requests by contracting parties, firms may report their data to
disclosure and reporting initiatives such as The Global Reporting Initiative or the Carbon
Disclosure
Project.
See
What
is
GRI?,
GLOBAL
REPORTING
INITIATIVE,
http://www.globalreporting.org/ AboutGRI/WhatIsGRI (last visited Oct. 7, 2011); What We Do,
CARBON
DISCLOSURE
PROJECT,
https://www.cdproject.net/en-US/WhatWeDo/Pages/
overview.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2011).
209. Courville, supra note 61, at 288–89 (“As one of the expectation gaps in social auditing
is the inability of the external auditor and certification system to constantly monitor
performance of the producer company, internal control systems or management systems can
provide a critical tool of more regular monitoring of performance. This is then complemented
by periodic planned and surprise checks by external auditors. However, where internal auditing
is used as a vehicle to reduce the external audit to less than 100 percent coverage, the difficulty
is in finding the right balance between internal and external auditing, balancing capacity
building, and ownership with inspectability to a consistent interpretation of the standards.”).
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internal auditing is used to reduce the comprehensiveness of an
210
external audit, however, the value of the auditing process declines.
6. Cooperatives
In contrast to the mechanisms outlined above, which improve
compliance by expanding monitoring, cooperatives reduce the
benefits a firm might receive from cheating. Cooperatives form when
groups of individuals or firms voluntarily decide to work together to
meet their collective needs or to share the profits from their
211
enterprise. Cooperatives are mutual benefit organizations; those
who use the enterprise control it, and control rights are exercised on a
212
one-person, one-vote basis.
Cooperatives may take the form of business organizations that
213
are owned by employees in equal shares, such as trade cooperatives,
or organizations that are owned by the individuals that actually use its
214
services, such as electrical utility cooperatives. While competition in

210. Id.
211. Morris Altman, History and Theories of Cooperatives, in INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CIVIL SOCIETY 563 (Helmut K. Anheir et al. eds., 2010). There are nearly
30,000 cooperatives in the U.S., owning more than $3 trillion in assets. They generate over $500
billion in revenue and $25 billion in wages. UNIV. OF WISCONSIN CTR. FOR COOPS., RESEARCH
ON
THE
ECONOMIC
IMPACT
OF
COOPERATIVES
2
(2009),
available
at
http://reic.uwcc.wisc.edu/sites/all/REIC_FINAL.pdf. They are not prominent in the scholarly
literature, however. Some scholars attribute this to a decline in coverage of institutions in
economics textbooks which has shifted toward neoclassical economics, and the changing role of
the economist as a social engineer that seeks optimal solutions. Panu Kalmi, The Disappearance
of Co-operatives from Economic Textbooks, 31 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 625, 639 (2007).
212. See Kalmi, supra note 211, at 627.
213. For example, fair trade certification and labeling programs often have a cooperative
element. Farmers that participate in the Fairtrade Labeling Organization are required to
participate in cooperatives designed to assist producers in developing and accessing new
markets and in building trading relationships. See Courville, supra note 61, at 279. The fair trade
premium garnered by the program is delivered to the cooperative and the cooperative members,
a joint body of workers and management, to decide how it is to be used. Id. at 280. They may
elect to remit the proceeds to the cooperative members or to use the money to make other
investments that will allow the group to enhance their operations and improve their
profitability. See id. at 281. Cooperatives also often seek to achieve social goals as well as serve
their members’ needs, such as promoting equality, recognizing human rights, and protecting the
environment. Kalmi, supra note 211, at 627.
214. During the Great Depression the extension of public utility services was seen to be a
key factor in reducing poverty and improving employment and interstate trade. Because the
costs of extending electricity to rural areas would likely exceed the benefits for many years, few
local and state governments were willing to make these investments. The Rural Electrification
Administration was created under the New Deal to make loans to rural electrification
cooperatives so that they could build lines and other infrastructure to transmit electricity to
rural residents. Exec. Order No. 7037 (May 11, 1935).
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a free market with full information and low transaction costs would
theoretically produce the greatest social welfare for both buyers and
215
purchasers, exercises of market power, hold-up problems, lack of
easy access to complete information, principal–agent problems, moral
216
hazard, and uncertainty may inhibit trade. Cooperatives address
problems associated with unfair competition and monopolistic use of
217
power either upstream or downstream by permitting individuals to
act collectively to obtain discounts and other benefits granted to
218
market actors that engage in larger and more regular transactions.
Cooperatives use vertical integration to address problems of hold219
up, which may occur in processing agricultural or other products
220
requiring time-sensitive processing or delivery. By purchasing and
managing the processing equipment or delivery mechanism,
cooperative members eliminate the parties in the supply chain that
may reduce the value of their goods by delay and force them to
221
relinquish price premiums for those goods.
While vertical
integration through merger is also possible, the cooperative form
permits decentralized decision-making and allows firms to capitalize
222
on time-based or location-specific knowledge.
Cooperative
215. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). Coase
theorizes that, with perfect information and in the absence of transaction costs, trade will give
rise to an economically efficient allocation of entitlements, regardless of how the entitlements
are originally allocated. If there is no cost associated with making an exchange, parties will
exchange entitlements until a Pareto optimal allocation occurs; trade will continue to occur until
no one can be made better off without making another party worse off.
216. GRUBER, supra note 163, at 126–28.
217. Michael Sykuta & Michael L. Cook, A New Institutional Economics Approach to
Contracts and Cooperatives, 83 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1273, 1276 (2001).
218. Altman, supra note 211, at 564–65.
219. The problem of hold-up occurs when two parties agree to cooperate to make a profit
and one party makes a significant investment in an asset whose use, economic productivity, and
therefore value, will depend on the cooperation of the other party. The first party’s sunk costs in
the asset put him at a disadvantage and gives the other party significant bargaining power. After
the first party makes the investment, the second party could demand a significantly higher
proportion of the profits—a change the first party will be forced to accept or otherwise face the
loss of his initial investment altogether.
220. Helmut M. Dietl & Martin Grossman, The Knowledge Economics of Cooperatives
(2006) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017844.
For example, dairy farmers that need to get milk to market face hold-up problems from
distributors to whom they sell the milk. Failure to get the milk to market in time will cause it to
spoil. By creating their own cooperative distribution system, farmers eliminate the principal–
agent problem and the incentive to hold-up.
221. See id. at 16 (discussing vertically integrated dairy cooperatives as a manner by which
producers can avoid the hold-up problem).
222. Id. When general knowledge is more important, vertical integration through merger
solves the hold-up problem and the centralized decision-making that results from merger will
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structures, therefore, also permit individuals or entities that otherwise
compete with each other to coordinate successfully without reducing
223
their incentives to compete or make decisions independently. In the
224
context of the theory of the firm, the decision to make (yielding
protection from opportunistic behavior at the expense of additional
225
coordination costs from centralized decision-making) or buy, if
opportunistic behavior and hold-out are less likely or less costly and
external transaction costs are relatively low, is expanded to include a
third option: cooperate.

not create additional inefficiencies. Id. When specific knowledge is needed, however, the
centralized decision-making may not allow the company to capitalize on time- or locationspecific knowledge of the merged entities. See generally Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of
Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 524 (1945) (“If we can agree that the economic
problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances
of time and place, it would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must be left to the people
who are familiar with these circumstances, who know directly of the relevant changes and of the
resources immediately available to meet them. We cannot expect that this problem will be
solved by first communicating all this knowledge to the central board which, after integrating all
knowledge, issues its orders. . . . We need decentralization because only thus can we ensure that
the knowledge of particular circumstances of time and place will be promptly used.”). If
decentralized decision-making processes remain in place to accommodate and allow the
company to benefit from idiosyncratic knowledge, the company will need to spend additional
resources to communicate and coordinate among the segments of the merged entity.
223. See, e.g., Dietl & Grossman, supra note 220, at 16–17. Most professional sports leagues
are organized as cooperatives. Individual sports teams would lose much of their value if they did
not use common rules, referees, scheduling, and marketing. Id. at 17. As Dietl and Grossman
note, refusal by any team to play according to common rules and schedules (an example of the
hold-up problem) would undermine the entire league. Id. However, they state that the common
market solution to hold-up problems—vertical integration through merger—would also
undermine league value, because fans could no longer trust that the individual teams were
sufficiently independent for real competition to occur. Id. Cooperative organization permits the
teams to maintain decentralized decision-making while participating in a binding structure that
eliminates the uncertainty associated with hold-up. Id. at 17
224. Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (hypothesizing that
firms begin to organize production inside a firm when the costs associated with that production
are lower than the transaction costs of bargaining to purchase goods from outside of the firm,
under knowledge constraints).
225. Peter G. Klein, The Make-or-Buy Decisions: Lessons from Empirical Studies, in
HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 436 (Claude Menard & Mary M. Shirley eds.,
2005) (“In the Coasian framework, the decision to organize transactions within the firm as
opposed to on the open market—the “make or buy” decision—depends on the relative costs of
internal versus external exchange. The market mechanism entails certain costs: discovering the
relevant prices, negotiating and enforcing contracts, and so on. Within the firm, the
entrepreneur may be able to reduce these ‘transaction costs’ by coordinating these activities
himself. However, internal organization brings other kinds of transaction costs, namely
problems of information flow, incentives, monitoring and performance evaluation. The
boundary of the firm, then, is determined by the tradeoff, at the margin, between the relative
transaction costs of external and internal exchange.”)
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Cooperatives also address agency problems.
When an
individual hires an agent to conduct business or enter into a
transaction on the individual’s behalf, a number of problems may
arise. First, the agent may have a conflict of interest: the principal
may not be able to tell whether the agent is serving the interests of
the principal or pursuing the agent’s own interests—a “moral hazard”
227
problem. Second, the agent may withhold information that the
principal would otherwise use to negotiate a fair price with the agent
228
if the principal had access to the information. Two ways that market
participants use contract law to solve the asymmetrical information
problem are to perform research before the transaction or to monitor
229
and enforce rules after the transaction. Both of these solutions can
be expensive. Cooperatives eliminate the agency and asymmetrical
information problems by allowing a market actor (such as the
230
consumer) to be involved on both sides of the transaction.
Additional profits to be gained from an agent succumbing to moral
hazard or using asymmetrical information to the detriment of the
person who hired them will accrue as a surplus not to the agent, but
231
to the cooperative as a whole. Surpluses are then distributed to
cooperative members in accordance with their relative contribution to
232
that surplus. The cooperative structure changes the incentives; if
consumers ultimately reap the profits from withholding information,
there is little reason for agents to withhold the information from
233
consumers in the first place. In times of legislative gridlock and

226. Sykuta & Cook, supra note 217, at 1274.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1276.
229. Id. at 1277.
230. Id.
231. Altman, supra note 211, at 538. In this hypothetical the individual would likely receive
a percentage of the surplus equivalent to the amount of his investment.
232. A trade cooperative rewards its members according to the members’ relative
production, a work cooperative according to the members’ labor, and a purchasing cooperative
according to the members’ patronage.
233. Sykuta & Cook, supra note 217, at 1279. Ultimately, the problem of monitoring
managers is addressed by internalizing the monitoring within the firm structure. Armen Alchian
& Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON.
REV. 777, 777–78 (1972). While an employee may act adversely to both the customer’s interest
and the employer’s interest, employee activities are more readily and regularly monitored, selfinterested actions are more easily detected, and their activities are less likely to cause as
extensive or widespread harm. As an empirical matter, regulation permits investor-owned firms
to proliferate where there would otherwise be significant problems with asymmetric
information, such as in the banking and insurance industries. HENRY HANSMANN, THE
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limited administrative budgets, it is therefore not surprising that
communities are turning again to cooperative structures to address
234
their own banking, consumer, and employment needs.
Table 4 identifies the challenges that arise at the monitoring
stage, the private governance institutions that address those
challenges, what they supply, and the characteristics the institutions
must have to be effective.
Table 4. Monitoring Institutions
Barrier or Hazard
Information
asymmetries

Suppliers
Acquisition and
investor
contracts

Structure Supplied
Due diligence and
underwriting
investigations

Lending
contracts

Contractual shift of
risk of loss

Keys to Effectiveness
Well-trained,
independent
investigators

Insurance
contracts
Information
asymmetries and
credence problems

Audit firms and
third party
assurance
arrangements

Monitoring and
reporting device

Well-trained,
independent
investigators
Accurate reporting to
interested parties

OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 294 (1996). Where regulation has been ineffective, however,
cooperative ownership is an obvious response.
234. See, e.g., Kevin Roose, Amid Wall Street Protests, Smaller Banks Gain Favor, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2011, at B5 (describing the shift to community banks, credit unions and banking
cooperatives to avoid new fees charged by larger banking institutions and to support investment
in local communities); Lee Romney, They’re Owning This Cooperation, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 28,
2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/28/local/la-me-richmond-20111128 (describing the
resurgence of cooperatives during the recession and efforts by cities such as Cleveland, Ohio;
Washington, D.C.; Amarillo, Texas; Atlanta, Georgia; and Richmond, Virginia to develop or
partner with cooperatives to increase employment and reduce poverty); Stuart Pfeifer & E.
Scott Reckard, One Facebook Post Becomes National Movement to Abandon Big Banks, L.A.
TIMES (Nov. 4, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/04/business/la-fi-bank-transfer20111105 (describing the impetus behind Bank Transfer Day).
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Suppliers
Disclosure and
reporting
initiatives

Voluntary
standards,
certification, and
labeling
institutions

Structure Supplied
Supplies information
on firm compliance
to investors, insurers,
lenders, supply chain
partners,
stakeholders,
regulatory bodies,
and general public

Keys to Effectiveness
Prescriptive standards

Provide labels to
signal whether
standards have been
met

Auditor training and
accreditation so goods
accurately and
consistently labeled

117

Comparable standards
(within an industry or
practice)
Independent verification
of compliance with
standards

Checks on conflicts of
interest: independence
of monitors from
standards setting groups,
from private contractors
assisting with
implementation, and
from participants
Accessible dispute
resolution mechanisms
Information
asymmetries

Cooperatives

Agency problems

Eliminates economic
incentives to cheat by
placing consumer on
both sides of
transaction

Moral hazard

E. Enforcement Institutions
As mentioned above, institutions may improve compliance with
rules by improving monitoring systems that increase the likelihood
that cheaters will be caught, by reducing the benefits of cheating, by
posing a credible threat of sanctions, and by increasing the penalties
of getting caught. This section discusses the innovative mechanisms
that private governance institutions have developed to pursue the
latter two strategies, including increasing the number of parties with
the power to enforce the rules, the benefits associated with
compliance, and the costs of noncompliance.
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1. Regulation by Contract
Firms have employed a number of contract mechanisms to
235
incentivize regulatory compliance from firms. Acquisition and
equity investors manage concerns about risk by refusing to contract,
negotiating lower purchase prices, shifting risk to the target
companies and their owners through indemnities and insurance
requirements, and requiring risk reduction and remediation efforts as
a funding contingency. They reward firms with lower risk profiles
with higher investments, higher purchase prices, more favorable deal
terms, and promises of additional contracts.
Similarly, following underwriting investigations, lenders may
refuse to lend, or they may include additional provisions in loan
agreements and ancillary documents that provide for continued
oversight, expanded default triggers, and contingencies for funding.
The additional rights that lenders may exercise if firms fail to comply,
such as declaring default, accelerating the repayment of the loan, and
controlling the use of loan proceeds, make the threat of sanctions
236
more immediate and credible.
Note that the goal of these
contractual provisions may simply be to give the lender a defense
when there is a threat of tort liability or a competing claim on the use
of loan proceeds if regulatory fines are imposed or remediation
237
efforts are required.
Insurance premium rate structures also
promote compliance, since insurance companies may inspect insured
parties to monitor their behavior and offer reductions in premiums if
238
firms remain compliant over time. If inspections reveal that the
insured party has misrepresented risk or broken covenants, the
insurer may also deny coverage. On the other hand, lenders may
reward compliant borrowers with lower rates, better terms, and
additional loans.
Supply chain anchors use third party assurance services to verify
compliance with quality control standards. They punish
noncompliance by withholding payments and terminating contracts,
235. See Vandenbergh, supra note 38, at 2044.
236. Id. at 2055. Lenders with private rights of enforcement sometimes create more
stringent standards. Id. at 2055–56.
237. Id. at 2052. Following the Fleet Factors case and the EPA’s development of certain safe
harbors that lenders may use to avoid liability for environmental torts, lenders may use these
kinds of provisions primarily for defensive purposes. In the event that the borrower is subject to
damages, fees, or fines as a result of tort liability or noncompliance, the lender retains the right
to control loan proceeds and may prevent them from being used to pay those liabilities or to
redress environmental impacts.
238. See id. at 2063.
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and they reward compliant suppliers with continued future contracts
and more favorable prices or terms.
2. Education and Mobilization Initiatives
Civic organizations investigate firm activities and sometimes
employ name and shame tactics that alert the public by identifying
firms responsible for environmental or social harms or by exposing
false claims of environmental or social responsibility. They enforce
public regulation and private governance regimes with threats of
boycotts, negative news media reports, the potential loss of market
share and investors, and the costs associated with new regulation.
When combined with the desire of firm owners, managers, and
employees to maintain an image of public integrity, these mechanisms
provide credible sanctions that pressure firms to reduce risk,
remediate adverse impacts, and keep their practices in alignment with
239
their claims and societal norms. Firms that can demonstrate they
meet or exceed the standards set by societal norms can also receive
240
positive attention and increased investment.
3. Conservation Land Trusts
Land conservancies, or conservation land trusts, are nonprofit
organizations that acquire rights to ecologically, environmentally, or
241
historically important properties. Land conservancies are commonly
developed to preserve open space, ranchland, farmland,
242
environmentally sensitive areas, water rights, and riparian zones.
These institutions pose an innovative solution to enforcement
problems by expanding the number of parties with property interests
and legal standing to enforce contractual rights. They may acquire
property in fee, obtain conservation easement rights, or purchase the
development or resource extraction rights associated with the
243
property. Sometimes land conservancies transfer the acquired rights
to federal or state governments for management and enforcement,
especially if the acquired rights are to lands adjacent to other publicly
held lands. But land conservancies may also hold the property rights

239. See Livermore, supra note 97, at 330–31 (describing how reputational forces can
motivate firms to avoid harmful environmental practices).
240. See id. at 331.
241. Zachary Bray, Reconciling Development and Natural Beauty, The Promise and
Dilemma of Conservation Easements, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 119, 121–22 (2010).
242. Id.
243. Id.
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in perpetuity, privately enforcing the land use restrictions in
conservation easements to prevent heirs from developing property
244
subject to the easement. Policymakers are increasingly considering
conservancies not only for managing ecologically sensitive and
historically important lands, but for preserving the relationships with
245
indigenous people who rely on those lands.
4. Voluntary Standards, Certification, and Labeling Systems
While other institutions enhance enforcement by increasing
sanctions or deter capture by expanding the number of enforcement
parties, voluntary standards, certification, and labeling systems use
markets to incentivize compliance. In general, voluntary standards,
certification, and labeling institutions market labeled goods and
facilities to the public so that they may offer firms positive
reputational benefits or retail price premiums to incentivize adoption
246
of the standards and implementation of the certification program.
By using a label to justify higher prices and generate goodwill, the
systems reduce the relative benefits of non-adoption. To the extent
that the programs determine that member firms have not continued
to conform to the certification standards, they may discipline the
firms through fines or other penalties and may ultimately bar the
firms from using the system’s label.
Note that unfair or unequal enforcement poses a challenge for
the institution. When participants allege that the enforcement

244. One example of a well-recognized land conservation trust is The Nature Conservancy.
The organization works throughout the United States and in thirty-one other countries to
identify and preserve the ecological resources that they identify as most important, including
forest, marine, and freshwater resources. The organization’s conservation work includes
obtaining property rights and transferring them to state and federal governments for
management, acquiring conservation easements over private properties, managing its own
private nature preserves, performing conservation services, and improving management
practices for millions of acres of land and water. See generally THE NATURE CONSERVANCY,
http://www.nature.org (last visited Jan. 19, 2012). In 2009, the Nature Conservancy had $4.6
billion in assets and an annual operating budget of $448 million. It received over $400 million in
member dues and donations and over $300 million in land sales and gifts that year. THE
NATURE CONSERVANCY, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT (2009), available at http://www.nature.org/
aboutus/ouraccountability/annualreport/Annual-Report-2009.xml?src=araboutus.
245. See, e.g., Mary Christina Wood & Zachary Welcker, Tribes as Trustees Again (Part I):
The Emerging Tribal Role in the Conservation Trust Movement, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 373
(2008); Mary Christina Wood & Matthew O’Brien, Tribes as Trustees Again (Part II):
Evaluating Four Models of Tribal Participation in The Conservation Trust Movement, 27 STAN.
ENVTL L. REV. 477 (2008); Karol Bourdreaux, A New Call of the Wild: Community-Based
Resource Management in Namibia, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 297 (2008).
246. Cashore et al., supra note 17, at 186–87.
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processes are being applied unfairly or unequally, the system can
247
undergo a loss of credibility and legitimacy. This may result in
248
increased cheating by the participants and potentially withdrawal
249
from the private governance scheme. One of the key distinctions
between private governance and formal government is that state
criminal and civil sanction are available to keep residents from
refusing to comply with the law and from opting out when formal
250
government is engaged. In contrast, private governance institutions
are maintained through the continuing agreement of their
participants and are more sensitive to disputes and opt-outs, which
can destabilize the regime. Voluntary standards, certification, and
labeling mechanisms avoid this problem by supplying conflict
resolution mechanisms that allow participants to resolve their
251
disputes cheaply and quickly. By requiring participation in dispute
resolution procedures, private governance institutions allow
participants to air grievances and resolve conflicts. Dispute resolution
mechanisms improve the likelihood of long-term success by reducing
252
their members’ need for and their opportunity to resort to exit.
Private governance institutions that include dispute resolution
mechanisms tend to be more stable and robust in the face of
challenges as well as resilient to external changes that occur over
253
time.
Independent of the market incentives to encourage participation
by producers and the enforcement and dispute resolution mechanisms
aimed at sustaining their participation, voluntary standards,
certification, and labeling systems also encourage continued
participation among consumers. Sociological literature suggests that
individuals are thought to take action based on the logic of
appropriateness rather than the result of a conscious cost-benefit

247. Courville, supra note 61, at 290.
248. Id. at 290.
249. Cashore et al., supra note 17, at 186–87.
250. Id. at 184.
251. UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY, supra note 54, at 267–68 (noting that
(1) all rules are subject to interpretation, (2) conflicts arise between participants even when they
have made the rules jointly, (3) low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms not only address
immediate conflicts, but reduce conflicts as the community becomes aware of the way the
conflicts have been resolved and the rules have been interpreted, and (4) such mechanisms also
deter capture by local elites).
252. Id.
253. Id.
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254

analysis. Institutions are viewed as social practices as individuals’
identities are shaped by their membership in groups, and they comply
255
with rules as a matter of habit. To the extent that a community’s
belief systems, norms, culture, and sense of connectedness create a
culture of compliance, it reduces the need to develop complex
systems for monitoring and enforcement and reduces the costs of
256
enforcement. On the other hand, if the parties participating in the
governance system share no common norms or share norms of
noncompliance, the costs associated with enforcing the regime will be
257
higher. Voluntary standards, certification, and labeling mechanisms
258
have often been developed by groups with a shared set of values or
259
a common mission. In turn, the groups have used their networks to
expand the market for certified goods, providing an avenue for group

254. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 63, 70; Young, Governance for Sustainable
Development, supra note 56, at 31; see also Lemos & Agrawal, supra note 9, at 76 (describing an
emerging literature focusing on popularity, responsiveness, legitimacy, transparency, and
accountability in the context of private governance).
255. See id.
256. Young, Institutions and Environmental Change, supra note 56, at 7 (contrasting the
collective action perspective with the social practices perspective). The collective action
perspective “assumes that individuals have preferences that are exogenous to their membership
in groups, that they act on the basis of some sort of utilitarian calculation, and that they
endeavor to maximize payoffs to themselves as individuals. Institutions form through a
process—explicit or implicit—of developing social contracts. The prisoner’s dilemma, the freerider problem, and more generally problems of burden sharing and compliance loom as critical
concerns among collective-action thinkers. The social practices perspective, by contrast,
assumes that the identities of individuals are shaped in part by group membership, that actors
are influenced by what is known as the logic of appropriateness as opposed to the logic of
consequences, and that compliance with institutional rights and rules often become a matter of
second nature or habit.” Id. See also Elinor Ostrom, Toward a Behavioral Theory Linking Trust,
Reciprocity, and Reputation, in TRUST AND RECIPROCITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY LESSONS FROM
EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH 19, 26, 33–34, 42–43, 48–49 (Elinor Ostrom & James Walker eds.,
2003) (discussing the lack of empirical support for predictions of behavior in less structured
situations than situations where the stakes are high and the numbers are low, such as
competitive market situations (p. 26), and discussing the positive impacts of in-person
communication (pp. 33–34) and reciprocity norms (pp. 42–43) on cooperation, and the positive
feedback loop between reciprocity norms, reputation for trustworthiness, and levels of trust (pp.
48–49)).
257. See Young, Institutions and Environmental Change, supra note 56, at 15; see also
Livermore, supra note 97, at 333.
258. Fair trade labeling activities were initially instituted by church groups and spread
through support of church networks, for example.
259. The Forest Stewardship Council was developed from an alliance between World Wide
Fund for Nature and a number of British firms following the breakdown of efforts to negotiate a
forestry treaty at the Rio Summit in 1992. About Us, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL,
http://www.fscus.org/about_us (last visited Oct. 7, 2011); Cashore et al., supra note 17, at 182.
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and network members to express their values and mission through
260
their consumption choices.
Furthermore, under post-structuralist theory, political scientists
see individuals as shaped by the ways that governments exercise
261
power. Governments are thought to achieve their ends less by
forcing people to comply with state-mandated goals than by making
262
them allies and confederates. The mere existence of a known rule
263
may influence behavior. In a coordination game, knowledge of the
264
law may change behavior, even without the threat of sanctions.
Similarly, the opportunity for citizens to make consumer choices
based on labels invites consumers to see themselves as citizen–
consumers, and enables them to take action through their
265
consumption choices and purchasing power.
To the extent
consumers use self-restraint in their consumption, they have
internalized the enforcement process.
Table 5 identifies the challenges that arise at the enforcement
stage, the private governance institutions that address those
challenges, what they supply, and the characteristics required for
effective enforcement.

260. Kysar, supra note 113, at 624–25; Cashore et al., supra note 17, at 181.
261. Lemos & Agrawal, supra note 9, at 84–86 (noting that an individual’s understanding
and governance of themselves are shaped through scientific inquiries that identify them and
their behaviors as targets of inquiry, through disciplinary practices that make distinctions
between types of individuals, and through modes of thought that make certain practices seem
more reasonable than others).
262. Id. at 84–85. These theories suggested that individuals’ private lives and actions are
also shaped by the way that knowledge is represented. In the process of following certain modes
of thought, or “discourses,” and engaging in certain practices, individuals posit themselves as
subjects and take actions consistent with that subjectivity. When the dominant discourse
changes, institutional change occurs. This line of inquiry is thought to be relevant particularly
for market-based forms of governance that posit individuals as global citizens and consumers,
those that label goods for consumption and for socially responsible investment, and the kinds of
programs that shape the information reported by firms along with their investment parameters.
263. See Williams, supra note 79, at 494 (citing Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler,
Testing the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance: Expressive Influence in an Experimental
Hawk/Dove Game 2 (2003) (Northwestern Law Legal Working Paper Series, Law and
Economics Papers Working Paper no. 29), available at http://law.bepress.com/nwwps/lep/art29).
264. See id. at 482.
265. Kysar, supra note 113, at 624–25.
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Table 5. Enforcement
Barrier or Hazard
Incentives to cheat

Suppliers
Education and
mobilization
initiatives

Structure Supplied
Public name and shame
campaigns

Keys to Effectiveness
Independence from
target

Incentives to cheat

Supply chain
anchors

Contractual enforcement
mechanisms for breach
and default, nonpayment
and reduced payment,
termination of contract

Complementary
monitoring devices
and credible threat of
enforcement

Incentives to cheat

Insurance
contracts

Refusal to insure after
underwriting, refusal to
pay claims, offer of
reduced premiums for
compliance, increased
premiums for
noncompliance

Underwriting review,
complementary
monitoring devices,
and credible threat of
enforcement

Incentives to cheat

Lending
contracts

Refusal to loan after
underwriting; loan
enforcement mechanisms:
stop payment, default
interest rates, fines,
acceleration of debt;
decision-making rights of
use of loan proceeds; calls
on collateral and crosscollateralized debt

Due diligence review,
complementary
monitoring devices,
and credible threat of
enforcement

Incentives to cheat

Equity
investment
contracts

Refusal to contract
following due diligence
review, enforcement of
indemnification
agreements, calls on
private collateral

Due diligence review,
complementary
monitoring devices,
and credible threat of
enforcement

Incentives to cheat

Socially
responsible
investment

Refusal to invest and
divestment

Complementary
monitoring and
reporting devices
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Suppliers
Voluntary
standards,
certification,
and labeling
mechanisms

Structure Supplied
Fines, sanctions, exclusion
from club (remove
participant from
membership in label
scheme)
Education and soft or
reflexive enforcement

125

Keys to Effectiveness
Checks on conflicts of
interest: independent
monitors separate
from standards setting
groups,
implementation
experts, and
participants
Accessible dispute
resolution
mechanisms

Incentives to cheat

Land
conservancies

Expands number of
parties available to
enforce bar on
development of private
lands

Court system to
enforce contracts

F. Funding Governance, a Public Good
Rules, and the institutions developed to enforce them, are public
266
goods, and the process of developing rules and effectuating them
can be expensive. Public goods are by definition non-rival. If public
goods are provided to anyone, everyone can enjoy their benefit
without diminishing others’ enjoyment of them. Public goods are also
non-exclusive—those who pay for the goods cannot exclude others
267
from their enjoyment. In general, not everyone will contribute to
the creation and maintenance of public goods to the extent of their
enjoyment of those goods because they may free-ride on the efforts of
others. Consequently, the private market will supply less of the public
268
goods than would be socially optimal.
Formal governments regulating within their own jurisdictional
boundaries have several advantages in funding, most particularly, the
latter stages of the regulatory process: implementation, monitoring,
and enforcement. As many have noted, formal governments have the
authority and the power to coerce implementation and compliance
269
through threat of criminal sanction or monetary fines. More
importantly, governments use their taxing power to overcome the

266. Edela Schlager, Rationality, Cooperation and Common Pool Resources, 45 AM.
BEHAV. SCIENTIST 801, 804 (2002).
267. See GRUBER, supra note 163, at 170.
268. Id. at 176–77.
269. Vogel, supra note 31, at 153; Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 57; Cashore et al., supra
note 17, at 284.
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free-rider problem and cover the costs of developing, effectuating,
and enforcing new rules. Unlike governmental regulation, private
governance institutions may not rely on state authority to cover the
costs of the implementation, monitoring, enforcement, and conflict
270
resolution processes. In addition, they must overcome free-rider
271
problems.
This has important consequences for institutional stability. In a
representative democracy, the tensions between interest groups tend
to occur primarily in the initial stages of the regulatory process: when
the agenda is set, when the standards are negotiated, and when the
programs are funded through the budgetary process. Firms must bear
the costs of implementing the regulation or suffer government
sanctions. The state bears the costs of monitoring, enforcement, and
dispute resolution through the courts and the state funds those
activities through tax revenues. In contrast, in private governance
institutions, participants must find resources to cover costs at each of
the regulatory stages; consequently, internal tensions among
participating interest groups may continue to occur throughout the
regulatory process.
To develop private governance institutions, most of the
participants must accept the rules at each stage; otherwise, they may
opt out. If the parties fail to reach an agreement, no institution
272
develops and no regulation occurs. If parties reach an initial
agreement but lack sufficient means or incentives to implement that
273
agreement, the policy will not be implemented. Incentives to cheat
remain unchecked if there are no monitoring or enforcement
274
mechanisms. If monitoring and enforcement are not performed in a

270. UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY, supra note 54, at 262–63 (describing
the importance of fair allocation of the cost and benefits of a regime to the regime’s long term
institutional stability).
271. Young, Governance for the Environment, supra note 56, at 16 (“The ‘free-rider’
problem . . . occurs in situations where the social benefits accruing from a public good exceed
the cost of supply, but individual members of the group would prefer to enjoy the good without
shouldering a share of the cost.”).
272. Id. at 21 (outlining the challenges of governance, including ignorance, high transaction
cost, and massive free-rider problems, that impede resolution of socio-environmental
problems).
273. Id. at 36 (“Bargaining processes can make governance systems incoherent, and
problems of implementation can turn them into dead letters.”).
274. UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY, supra note 54, at 265–67 (describing
the importance of monitoring and enforcement); Stepan Wood, Voluntary Environmental Codes
and Sustainability, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY 229, 260–62 (Benjamin J.
Richardson & Stepan Wood eds., 2006).
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fair manner and there are no systems to permit participants to appeal
decisions or resolve disputes, participants may refuse to comply with
275
the rules. The participants in private governance institutions must
find resources to fund or otherwise support each stage of the
regulatory process themselves. Furthermore, the way the costs of
these burdens are allocated among the participants can have a
276
significant impact on the effectiveness of the regulation.
In smaller self-governing communities, Elinor Ostrom has
observed that the costs and benefits associated with successful
277
regulatory regimes tend to be proportionate for the participants. If
participants’ costs bear no relation to their benefits, they may either
278
opt out or cheat, causing the system to unravel. The same dynamic
is observed at the international level. States must come to an
agreement that is collectively acceptable; there is no coercive power
279
to ensure compliance.
To the extent that certain states
disproportionately bear the burdens from change and others reap the
benefits, a mechanism is required to permit costs to be shared or the
280
agreement will be unstable.
Sources of financial support may also shape the behavior of
281
private governance institutions. Institutions that are funded by
membership dues may be more likely to take actions that align with
member interests and the public interest than those that receive funds

275. UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY, supra note 54, at 267–68 (describing
the importance of dispute resolution mechanisms to the regime’s long term institutional
stability).
276. See id. at 262; GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 90, at 92 (explaining that in
robust institutions, there is congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local
conditions).
277. UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY, supra note 54, at 262–63.
278. Id. at 263.
279. See generally Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction to LOCAL COMMONS
AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE (Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995).
280. Note that this phenomenon has been observed in the common pool resource context
and is the basis in part for caution against using any particular governing approach as a panacea.
Following recognition of the extent to which the earth’s ecosystems were subject to a tragedy of
the commons problem, many governments began to privatize forests and other natural
resources, following the approach suggested by Garrett Hardin. Because many governments
failed to allocate adequate resources to monitoring and enforcing restrictions on harvesting, the
rate at which harvesting occurred accelerated, exacerbating the problem. In contrast, forests
governed by local communities that assigned monitoring duties to individuals that would benefit
directly from enforcement of the harvesting limits, fared well. See GOVERNING THE COMMONS,
supra note 90, at 23.
281. Lyon, supra note 21, at 2.
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282

primarily from foundations or private industry. On the other hand,
scholars have noted that while civic institutions are effective in
pointing out failures, they may be limited in what they can achieve
283
without the aid of regulatory institutions. The activities that
membership organizations pursue may also reflect the limitations of
284
member involvement.
Membership-based organizations rely
primarily on annual membership fees to cover the costs of their
activities. They therefore have incentives to focus on activities in
285
which they may garner media attention and attract new members.
Media-worthy activities, such as exposing harmful practices,
identifying bad actors, and initiating educational campaigns, tend to
occur at the beginning of the regulatory process when the regulatory
agenda is set, and at the end of the process, when the rules must be
286
enforced. Members may find it more difficult to engage during rule
negotiations when the standards are set and statutory language is
287
drafted, particularly if technical expertise is required.
Public

282. Robert J. Brulle & J. Craig Jenkins, Civil Society and the Environment: Understanding
the Dynamics and Impacts of the U.S. Environmental Movement, in GOOD COP, BAD COP:
ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS AND THEIR STRATEGIES TOWARD BUSINESS 73, 77, 92 (Thomas P.
Lyon ed., 2010) (describing the discussion in the literature of impacts of foundation funding as
shifting environmental nonprofits away from protest and grassroots mobilization and toward
professionalized, centralized, nondemocratic structures with more moderate agendas); Lyon,
supra note 21, at 5 (“Indeed, critics charge that instead of being governed by citizens, the
environmental movement has become increasingly controlled by foundations that represent
large corporate wealth and rationalized power in the American political economy. This, they
say, blunts the potential impact of the movement, promotes nonparticipatory civic
organizations, and limits the range of viewpoints represented in the public arena.”).
283. See Vogel, supra note 31, at 153, 165–66, 181–84. For example, the Rainforest Action
Network is a well-known example of a civic organization that engages in grassroots activism and
direct action focused on well-recognized leaders in industry and commerce to achieve its goals
to protect rainforests and to defend the rights of rainforest inhabitants. Krill, supra note 60, at
208, 210. Factors that NGOs examine in determining which businesses they will target include
the market share of the corporation, its reputation, and the distance that activists must travel to
reach the corporation’s headquarters. Vogel, supra note 34, at 268. The organization derives its
$4 million budget equally from membership dues, major donations, and foundation support—a
proportion the organization tries to maintain. Krill, supra note 60, at 213. The organization has
approximately 13,000 members, 100,000 online supporters, and 1000 activists that participate
regularly. Id. The organization engages in street protests, initiates advertising campaigns,
develops shareholder resolutions, negotiates directly with corporate boards, and generally tries
to coordinate with other organizations that work on the same or similar issues to attack the
concern from a different angle. Id. at 213, 217.
284. See Vandenbergh, supra note 89, at 960.
285. Mattli & Woods, supra note 3, at 29.
286. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 63–64.
287. Id. at 67–69. To the extent that the standards setting process is technical, the nuances
may be difficult to explain, complicating any advocacy role that members may play. See id.
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participation in the implementation and monitoring stages may also
be challenging given firm interests in protecting trade secrets and in
288
maintaining operational efficiency and security. For this reason,
membership organizations that rely on the financial support of
members and grassroots fundraising events may tend to focus on
media-intensive activities that raise awareness and shift public
289
debate —activities that support the agenda-setting and enforcement
stages of regulation.
In contrast, organizations funded by private foundations and
corporate entities often undertake projects that more strongly
resemble traditional government activities, such as including the
monitoring and regulation of firm behavior and the truthfulness of
firm claims, and funding and developing public goods, such as
290
conservation of endangered habitat. They may also undertake
market-enhancing activities, such as the creation of exchanges to
facilitate the trade of environmental goods, or the development of
new markets and branding systems to direct public attention to
alternative goods that meet consumer social and environmental
291
preferences. The kinds of projects that these institutions undertake
may simply reflect the availability of stable sources of funding. Longterm, ambitious projects are less interesting in terms of
confrontational activity and media interest, but may be more effective
in addressing the social and environmental problems. On the other
hand, these projects give rise to fewer conflicts with corporate
interests, raising questions about whether firm interests are steering

288. Because implementation, monitoring, and enforcement may occur where the public
lacks the access (because firm security bars access), geographic location, or technical skills to
assist in any meaningful way, members are unlikely to be able to play any direct role.
Consequently, they may not be as ready to provide funding to support endeavors when they
cannot participate or see the impacts directly.
289. Vogel, supra note 31, at 169; see also Mattli & Woods, supra note 3, at 29 (“[T]here are
strong incentives for NGOs to focus their attention on the first phase of regulation—agendasetting. The immediate benefits to NGOs of mobilizing campaigns are likely to be high: media
attention brings them funding, new members, and public support. By contrast, engagement in
the detailed elaboration of regulations or closely monitoring their enforcement is more timeconsuming, more resource-intensive, and less easily effective or noticed.”).
290. Lyon, supra note 21, at 5; Vogel, supra note 31, at 154–55; Hoffman & Bertels, supra
note 7, at 59–62 (showing the growing schism between (1) environmental organizations with
corporate and foundation support that define themselves in conjunction with business and
capitalist systems and take more moderate stances and enter into collaborative agreements with
organizations such as the Environmental Defense Fund and The Nature Conservancy, and (2)
organizations that avoid such ties and define themselves in opposition to corporations and their
activities, such as Greenpeace and the Rainforest Action Network).
291. Hoffman & Bertels, supra note 7, at 59–62, 64.
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292

NGOs’ activities through foundation-based and corporate funding.
Some organizations have developed structures to maintain a balance
of funding from a variety of sources to avoid conflicts of interest that
may arise between their mission and the interests of those that
293
provide significant funding.
Given these tensions, private governance institutions have
developed a number of innovative mechanisms to generate higher
prices and other forms of funding, including some forms of corporate
social responsibility, SRI firms, voluntary standards, certification, and
labeling mechanisms, and producer cooperatives. Other institutions
lower costs, such as some forms of CSR programs, environmental
management systems, codes of conduct, and buyer cooperatives.
Some programs play a facilitative role in increasing prices or reducing
costs, including models and meta-standards, learning initiatives, and
disclosure and reporting initiatives.
For firms seeking capital, loans, supply contracts, or insurance,
meeting the demands and addressing the concerns of counterparties
to their contracts are simply a cost of doing business. For equity
investors, lenders, or insurance companies, due diligence
investigations and contract requirements reduce risk and increase
rewards for investments made. To the extent the costs of managing
their supply chains are not immediately expensed in the year
incurred, supply chain anchors and retailers may pass the costs
294
forward to consumers or back to suppliers.
To the extent that voluntary regulatory activities require
investments to produce firm savings, firms will decide whether or not
to make an investment based on the time frame in which they are
able to recover the costs of their investment. Cost recovery is
accelerated when income tax provisions permit deductions for the full
292. Lyon, supra note 21, at 5; Hoffman & Bertels, supra note 7, at 56 (“Board interlocks
are mechanisms for gaining access to critical resources such as information and, of particular
importance to NGOs, funding, both because individual board members will influence their
corporations’ giving and because the closer connections they have to others will also raise
overall giving levels. But they also become mechanisms for influence by incorporating
representatives from other institutions in the NGOs’ decision-making processes or advisory
structures” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). Note that some studies have shown that
the existence of a confrontational environmental NGO to place pressure on corporate entities
has had both a positive flanking effect (by providing a contrast) and a negative flanking effect
(from the risk of being associated with the more radical groups and experiencing backlash). Id.
at 63–66.
293. Krill, supra note 60, at 213 (describing the funding structure of Rainforest Action
Network and its rationale).
294. The actual incidence and distribution of these costs has not yet been modeled.
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expense of activities associated with voluntary regulatory regimes in
the year they are incurred. When significant capital investments are
involved, such as technological changes, firms may be required to
capitalize the investment and recover the costs through depreciation
deductions over time. Cost savings and capital recovery enjoyed
immediately following implementation make investments more
attractive.
Voluntary standards, certification, and labeling systems address a
portion of the costs of governance by charging fees to their members.
They also market the certification and labeling program to generate
market demand and procure a price premium for certified goods.
Certification participants may use these premiums to cover the costs
of participating in the certification process. SRI firms, like other
investment firms, charge their clients fees to meet their clients’
preferences.
Funding sources for many private governance institutions may
include charitable donations from individuals, firms, and foundations
and grants from governmental entities. Conservation land trusts
benefit from tax exempt status as charities and may also receive
donated property or funds to purchase property rights and manage
them. They may also receive royalties from leases of resource
extraction rights. Donors benefit from tax deductions that are
295
available for donations or below-market sales to public charities.
Table 6 below identifies the main sources of funding for the
various types of private governance institutions.
Table 6. Funding Sources and Economic Incentives
Institution
Firm Programs

Funding Sources
Green and social premium; savings from increase in efficiency,
lower costs, less waste

Codes of Conduct

Reduction in competitive risk from competitors; benefits of
preempting regulation

Environmental
Management Systems

Cost savings from coordination within firm, increased compliance,
reduced costs from monitoring

295. See 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2006). A number of concerns have arisen about fraudulent activity
associated with valuation of the conservation easements, the value of the properties to which
they are subject, and the tax benefits that accrue to the individuals who participate in these
transactions. There are also concerns about whether conservation easements will be enforced
over time. See generally Bray, supra note 241.

Roberts_FINAL (Do Not Delete)

132

2/5/2012 6:03 PM

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

[Vol. 22:67

Institution
Acquisition and
Investment Contracts

Funding Sources
Reduced risk of loss and shifting of risk of loss following due
diligence investigations through contractual arrangements

Lending Contracts

Reduced risk of loss and shifting of risk of loss following due
diligence investigations through contractual arrangements

Supply Chain Contracts

Green and social premium; reduced risk of loss from unstable
supply, contract claims, tort liability

Insurance Contracts

Reduced risk of loss and shifting of risk of loss following
underwriting investigations through exclusions from coverage

Cooperatives

Reduction of risk of loss from information asymmetries and
moral hazard; increased profits from increased bargaining power
and economies of scale in sales and purchase

Education and
Mobilization Initiatives

Private donations, foundation funding, grants

Learning Initiatives

Private donations, foundation funding, grants, fees for services

Reporting Initiatives

Private donations, foundation funding, grants, fees for services

Models and MetaStandards

Private donations, foundation funding, grants, fees for services

Third-Party Audits

Fees for services

Socially Responsible
Investment

Investment fees

Land Conservancies

Private donations; foundation funding; sales, rents, royalties from
lands; tax incentives to donors; tax exempt status of nonprofit and
state property tax exemption

Certification and
Labeling Systems

Price premium for certified goods; membership fees; foundation
funding; private donors

As noted above in part I, supra, each type of private governance
system has something to contribute to the regulatory process. Table 6
identifies each stage of regulation and the types of private governance
institutions that bring resources to bear at each stage. Not every
institution has all of the structures needed to produce regulation that
is in the public interest at every stage. In fact, as Table 7 shows, only
voluntary standards, certification, and labeling systems and
cooperatives attempt to address governance needs at every stage of
the regulatory process.
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Table 7. Private Governance Institution Supply at Each Stage of
Governance
Institution

AgendaSetting

Education and
Mobilization Initiatives
Supply Chain Contracts
Insurance Contracts
Firm CSR Programs
Socially Responsible
Investment
Codes of Conduct
Environmental
Management Systems
Learning Initiatives
Reporting Initiatives
Models and MetaStandards
Acquisition and
Investment Contracts
Lending Contracts
Audits
Voluntary standards,
certification, and labeling
systems
Cooperatives

X

Negotiation;
Setting of
Standards

Implement
ation

Monitor
ing

Enforce
ment
X

X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X

(X)
(X)
(X)

X
X
(X)
X

(X)

X
(X)

(X)

X

(X)

X
X
X

X*

X

X

X

X

(X)
X
X

X*

X*

X*

X*

X = Provides (X) = Varies X*= Stage internalized

However, private governance institutions frequently operate as
296
part of a network or an ensemble regime. Consequently, they may
complement one another and, potentially, produce synergistic
297
effects.
For example, one possible sequence may proceed as follows. At
the agenda-setting stage, NGOs educate consumers about lead
contamination in toys sold by a leading retailer. At the negotiation of
standards stage, the retailer, under threat of tort litigation, sets
substantive requirements for its suppliers to exclude lead and similar
substances in the manufacturing of products. To implement the
retailer standards, suppliers employ management systems designed to
296. See generally Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9; Oren Perez, Private Environmental
Governance as Ensemble Regulation: A Critical Exploration of Sustainability Indexes and the
New Ensemble Politics, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 543 (2011).
297. See generally Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9.
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avoid the use of lead and similar substances in the manufacture and
assembly of the products and require their secondary suppliers to
exclude those substances in the manufacture of component parts. To
monitor and enforce the contract, the retailer includes provisions for
periodic inspections and hires an auditing firm to verify that its
requirements are being met. Based on the audits, the retailer
sanctions suppliers that fail to adhere to its standards through
contract or by withholding repeat business. The retailer funds the
process by increased consumer prices, but the price increase may be
298
justified as a premium for safety assurances.
In fact, this shift to decentralized, multi-modal, networked forms
of governance may be necessary to address the kinds of complex
environmental problems that have resisted solution by centralized
299
governmental regulation.
Private governance may provide
298. Another possible sequence may involve additional participants. NGOs increase
awareness about sweatshop labor conditions in apparel manufacturers in Southeast Asia and
identify particular companies that employ child laborers and have poor safety records. They
may also engage in name and shame campaigns and institute boycotts of the products of the
specific companies identified. SRI firms screen those manufacturers from their list of
investments and sell stock from those companies. To rehabilitate its reputation and restore its
market share, the company becomes a member of a learning initiative and employs a
management system. By implementing new management processes, the company improves
conditions. The company employs a third-party audit to confirm to the learning initiative and
the reporting initiative that it has made improvements. The reporting initiative in turn provides
information about these changes to investors, retail chain suppliers, and the general public. The
company covers the costs associated with engagement of the learning initiative and the
reporting initiative and employing the environmental management system, but passes the costs
forward in the price of its apparel and gains market share from an improved reputation. SRI
firms again include the stock of the company in their portfolios and consumers again purchase
the goods following confirmation that the firm’s labor practices have improved and are being
monitored.
299. See Craig Anthony Arnold, Fourth-Generation Environmental Law: Integrationist and
Multimodal, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 771 (2011) (arguing that both
monolithic and fragmented approaches to environmental problems are proving inadequate, that
environmental law is evolving toward use of multiple methods to manage complex
environmental problems, and that those methods require some level of coordination for success
in addressing the complexities of social ecological systems); J.B. Ruhl & James E. Salzman,
Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for
Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59 (2010) (describing problems resistant to any one policy
response, such as problems that aggregate proportionally, problems in which responses to one
source can exacerbate another source, problems with feedback loops in which policy responses
may have extensive spill-over hazards, and problems with significant discontinuities in which the
impacts are felt far from the source of the problem or at some point in the distant future).
Similarly, Elinor Ostrom, writing in the political science literature, suggests that there are no
panaceas in addressing complex social ecological systems, and offers an expanded version of her
IAD framework to analyze the rules, institutions, networks, and nested enterprises developed to
manage these systems. See Elinor Ostrom, A Diagnostic Approach for Going Beyond Panaceas,
104 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 15,181 (2007).
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additional, independent cuts at problems that may not otherwise be
300
amenable to “whittling away” by formal government responses.
Furthermore, concerns associated with the theory of the firm may
determine whether an organization performs all aspects of the
301
regulatory process or relies on other institutions to perform them.
Note, however, that a number of voluntary standards, certification,
and labeling systems have identified credibility costs associated with
having the monitoring functions housed within the same entity that
302
performs standards-setting and implementation functions.
III. CONFLICT AND COMPETITION AMONG PRIVATE GOVERNANCE
INSTITUTIONS
While combinations of private governance institutions may
collaborate to produce effective regulation, private governance
systems also conflict with formal government and with one another.
303
First, they may compete for regulatory space and support. Trade
304
305
and CSR efforts
may disarm
association codes of conduct
education and mobilization initiatives that are making a case for

300. Cf. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 299, at 120 (concluding that a single government
agency is often incapable of combatting complex problems caused by multiple actors).
301. See Klein, supra note 225. Under a transaction-cost analysis, whether a firm performs
functions itself or outsources those functions may depend on whether the internal costs of
information flow, incentives, monitoring, and performance evaluation of employees outweigh,
at the margin, the external transaction costs associated with relying on other entities to perform
parts of the regulatory process. In addition, private governance institutions are often developed
to address government failures. To the extent that the courts are not functioning as the source
of enforcement of contracts, private governance institutions may chose instead to internalize
these activities.
302. See Courville, supra note 61, at 283, 287–88.
303. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 78–79.
304. Auld et al., supra note 9, at 423. Trade associations have often developed codes of
conduct in the wake of an industry disaster, with the goal of deterring government regulation.
Id. For example, following the Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal, the chemical industry was
successful in deflecting the threat of regulation by developing a code of conduct called the
Responsible Care Program. Id. Subsequent studies have shown that Responsible Care
participants showed worse environmental performance than firms that did not join program. See
id; Vogel, supra note 31, at 167–68 (providing as examples the pharmaceutical industry’s
adoption of the International Code of Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices to ward off threat of
regulation by the World Health Organization, and the International Chamber of Commerce’s
development of a Business Charter for Sustainable Development to forestall environmental
regulation following the 1992 Rio Earth Summit).
305. See Vogel, supra note 31, at 167–68 (describing how in 1992, following the Rio Summit,
the Chamber of Commerce developed a Business Charter for Sustainable Development to
deflect possible global environmental regulation).
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306

regulation and preempt other public or private regulatory activity.
They may undermine coalitions by splitting them into factions
307
supporting greater or lesser regulatory stringencies. They may also
divert the attention away from firms that would otherwise be targets
for activism and toward programs that would not otherwise be
308
primary targets.
Second, private governance regimes are sometimes used in an
anti-competitive manner against other firms within a common
industry. Anchor firm requirements that their supply chains
implement environmental controls may have significant anticompetitive impacts. By requiring their supply chain contractors to
invest in expensive technology, anchor firms may spread the costs of
their own regulatory compliance. When a firm requires its supplier to
make a regulatory change, the supplier may raise the price of its
goods for all of its customers to cover the costs associated with
change; thus, a portion of the financial burden of change shifts to the
309
firm’s competitors. When the competitors are sensitive to price
changes on their inputs, the increase in price may drive them out of
310
business, revealing a potential anti-competitive motive behind the
requirement. Firms promoting codes of conduct within their
industries may also have an anti-competitive motive in promulgating
new rules and requirements for their competitors. If they have lower
costs of compliance compared to their competitors, the new rules will
put them at an advantage.
While competition for regime participants has at times caused
311
private governance institutions to ratchet up their standards and

306. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 75.
307. Id. at 76.
308. Id. This data may indicate that codes of conduct only shield industry from regulation,
and are ineffective in improving environmental performance because of weak standards and
significant free-riding. However, some scholars have suggested that the comparatively poor
performance of members of the Responsible Care Program could be the result of a shift in the
focus of education and mobilization initiatives away from Responsible Care participants and
toward other firms that did not sign up for the program. See Lyon, supra note 3, at 59.
309. Vandenbergh, supra note 89, at 950.
310. See id.
311. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 78 (“Implicit bargaining takes the form of
competition among parallel schemes to control the regulatory space. In some cases, competition
exerts pressure toward higher standards.”). See also Auld et al., supra note 17, at 192 (explaining
how “comparative reports in the United States [between the standards of Forest Stewardship
Council and the Sustainable Forestry Initiative] were used to pressure the SFI to continually
change, narrowing the gap between its approach and that of the FSC”).
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312

implement more democratic structures and procedures,
more
frequently it has forced civic institutions to water down their
313
314
standards. SRI programs compete for investors, while labeling
315
systems compete for both consumers and participants. Institutions
with lower minimum standards attract more participants because, in
general, the participants have to incur fewer costs to participate.
Higher standards may be more attractive to consumers to the extent
that they more closely align with consumer preferences for risk.
Trade associations have often used the second mover
316
advantage to develop alternate schemes that resemble stringent
312. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 78 (“Industry schemes . . . which may have been
created with the aim of preemption but must compete with NGO and multi-stakeholder
schemes for legitimacy and public support—have over time strengthened their substantive
standards, procedures . . . and governance (e.g., adding stakeholder advisory or supervisory
boards).”).
313. For instance, the Forest Stewardship Council, an organization developed with input
from business, government, and environmental organizations, has created a certification and
labeling system for forest management and forest products to encourage sustainable harvesting.
The organization has been criticized as having allowed its standards to be compromised in order
to increase the participation by large retail firms in the United States and the European Union.
314. For examples of eco-friendly investments attempting to attract participants, see
Sustainable & Responsible Investing, CALVERT INVESTMENTS, http://www.calvert.com/sri.html
(last visited Oct. 4, 2011); DOMINI SOCIAL INVESTMENTS, http://www.domini.com (last visited
Oct. 4, 2011); About Us, ACUMEN FUND, http://www.acumenfund.org/about-us.html (last visited
Oct. 4, 2011).
315. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 76 (“In a variety of sectors, once an NGO-based or
collaborative scheme has been created and begins to press firms to sign on, the relevant industry
association creates a competing, business-friendly scheme. Examples include SFI and PEFC,
forest industry schemes created in response to the FSC, and WRAP, an apparel industry labor
rights scheme created in response to the FLA.”). The Fair Labor Association (FLA) was
developed in the late 1990s as the monitoring and certification branch of the Apparel Industry
Partnership formed to address sweatshop labor practices by the Clinton administration, the
Union of Needletrades, Industrial, and Textile Employees, NGOs such as the Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights and International Labor Rights Fund, and apparel
manufacturers. Tim Bartley, Certifying Forests and Factories: States, Social Movements, and the
Rise of Private Regulation in the Apparel and Forest Products Fields, 31 POL. & SOC’Y 433, 449–
50 (2003). FLA certifies apparel industry supply chains. Errol Meidinger, Beyond Westphalia:
Competitive Legalization in Emerging Transnational Regulatory Systems 18 (2006) (Buffalo
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2006-019), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=917952. In contrast, Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP) was
founded by the apparel industry and certifies individual factories. Id. “The competition among
the programs has been intense and contentious at times.” Id.
316. While “first movers” face high costs associated with research, development,
implementation, and educating the public to develop a market for their goods, second movers
may take advantage of what the first movers have done. Second movers face lower costs
because they may use the first mover as a model, learning from first mover successes and
failures, and enjoying the market that the first mover developed. See Michael Abramowicz &
John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 340
(2008) (describing the two advantages that late entrants have over early market experimenters
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systems developed by civic institutions in structure, but contain only
317
minimal requirements for compliance. Asymmetric information
318
creates an opportunity for opportunistic behavior. Weak labels may
attempt to free-ride on the goodwill associated with strong labels and
capture a portion of the premiums generated through labeling green
319
or socially responsible goods. When a number of labels emerge in
rapid succession, noise may overwhelm the signal that a labeling
320
system sends.
Multiple schemes in any sector may result in investor and
321
consumer confusion. When multiple certification systems govern
the same industry or subject matter, consumers and investors may
become concerned about whether the certification systems continue
to signal environmental performance. To the extent that the public
recognizes that there may be differences between labels, consumers
322
and investors may demand more information.
Identifying,
documenting, and segregating firms or products based on social and
environmental criteria is expensive. Efficiency declines as consumers
are required to spend more time and resources investigating labels.
Even where there are no competing labels, a certification process
may decouple from the practices and performance that the
323
certification process is supposed to reflect. Chain of custody and
324
other verification systems are also vulnerable to cheating and fraud.
as avoiding the expense of developing the market and copying the first entrant’s market
successes and avoiding its failures). Consequently, second movers may capture greater market
share.
317. These organizations “adopt the trappings” of fair regulatory processes to develop
guidelines without actually imposing prescriptive requirements. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9,
at 76; Auld et al., supra note 17, at 189–95 (comparing SFI to FSC). See also Auld, supra note 9,
at 422 (describing ISO 14000, an NGO-developed model environmental management system,
which certifies firms that develop internal management processes but does not require that the
systems contain prescriptive standards or impose any benchmarks or requirements).
318. See King et al., supra note 142, at 1092.
319. Wood, supra note 274, at 259.
320. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 79–80.
321. There is some suggestion that this may be a form of intentional interplay. Creating a
similar label allows a firm to free-ride on the goodwill and value associated with existing labels.
This may substantiate the move by the Federal Trade Commission in 1992 to regulate green
claims. See Michelle Diffenderfer & Keri-Ann C. Baker, Greenwashing: What Your Client
Should Know to Avoid Costly Litigation and Consumer Backlash, 25 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV’T 21 (2011).
322. Darby & Karni, supra note 87, at 84.
323. King et al., supra note 142, at 1094.
324. Id. at 1094 (“The third-party audits required by certified management standards
reduce the risk of decoupling, but as demonstrated by recent scandals in cost accounting, thirdparty certification does not guarantee honesty, nor does it prevent changes in practices after
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This may cast doubt not only on the particular system in question, but
also on the integrity of all certification processes.
Consequently, demand has grown for increased transparency and
325
a means to evaluate the various certification and labeling programs.
Again, private governance institutions have arisen to meet this
demand. Some nonprofit organizations have begun to address label
confusion by compiling lists of all known eco-labels and evaluating
those institutions based on self-reported information from the
326
organizations developing the labels.
Consumers have also
327
developed websites and blogs to expose false claims. In addition,
private firms have also begun to respond to demand for information
about social and environmental claims to prevent clients from losing
market share from greenwashing and to keep competitors from freeriding on their development of markets for socially responsible and
328
sustainable sourcing.
Finally, in some cases, the federal government has intervened to
protect consumer expectations and control labeling and advertising
claims. The Federal Trade Commission Act authorized the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) to take direct action against the firms that
certification. If decoupling becomes too frequent, certification will no longer provide real
information for differentiating underlying organizational attributes . . . .”).
325. See, e.g., ECOLABEL INDEX, http://www.ecolabelindex.com/ecolabels/ (last visited Oct.
5, 2011) (providing a database that lists and describes various ecolabels, with the aim of
“increasing transparency and helping buyers and sellers use [ecolabels] more effectively”). As
with all verification processes, the effectiveness of this endeavor is limited by the truthfulness of
the organizations’ responses, whether the organizations are subject to having their submissions
verified, and of course, the pertinence and clarity of the questions to which the organizations are
asked to respond. Bibi van der Zee, Listing the Green Labels, GUARDIAN GREEN LIVING BLOG
(Jan. 31, 2008, 5:22 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/ethicallivingblog/2008/
jan/31/labelgeeks (describing how the ecolabel index helps consumers understand otherwise
“incomprehensible” ecolabels).
326. See, e.g., ECOLABEL INDEX, supra note 325.
327. Diffenderfer & Baker, supra note 321, at 21, 25; see also Lane, supra note 8, at 747–48.
328. TerraChoice Group, Inc., an environmental marketing firm, has begun to issue annual
reports examining firm environmental and social claims, identifying seven “sins” of
greenwashing: lack of proof, vagueness, irrelevance (advertising absence of substances already
banned by law), hidden trade-offs, creating false impressions of third-party endorsements,
distracting the consumer from broader impacts, and lying. See The Seven Sins, TERRACHOICE:
SINS OF GREENWASHING, http://sinsofgreenwashing.org/findings/the-seven-sins/ (last visited
Oct. 2, 2011). EnviroMedia Social Marketing, Inc., a public relations and advertising firm, has in
conjunction with the University of Oregon developed a website that allows consumers to post
copies of advertisements that contain environmental and social claims and to rate the ads based
on whether the ads mislead with words, visual, or graphic information, make claims that are
vague or impossible to prove, overstate or exaggerate, or omit or mask key information. See
About Greenwashing, GREENWASHING INDEX, http://www.greenwashingindex.com/criteria.php
(last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
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329

make unfair or deceptive advertising claims. Following consumer
complaints about greenwashing, the FTC developed Guides for the
330
Use of Environmental Marketing Claims (“Green Guides”) in 1992.
The FTC has since revised the guides twice and a new version is due
331
to be released this year. The Green Guides provide firms with a safe
harbor against claims for unfair or deceptive advertising under the
332
Federal Trade Commission Act, so long as the firms making
environmental claims are specific and provide substantiation of those
333
claims.
CONCLUSION
The process of sorting private governance institutions by their
function in addressing regulatory needs and meeting the challenges of
government failure at each stage of the regulatory process has yielded
a number of insights about what kinds of structures make private
governance institutions effective and ways that networked institutions
may work together to form a regulatory regime that is in the public
interest.
First, it is not necessary for a single private governance
institution to meet the governance demands of all stages of the
regulatory process for private governance to be effective. Private
governance institutions may work together through collaboration,
cooperation, and contractual arrangements with other institutions and
with formal government to achieve effective regulation through a
networked or ensemble regime. There are, however, certain design
features that strengthen regulatory regimes at the various stages.
Supplemental structures, collaboration with other institutions, or
specific forms of support from formal government may address
weaknesses in existing regimes.
At the agenda-setting stage, private governance institutions that
are independent of their regulatory targets can bring public
awareness to social costs associated with firm activities and credibly
identify the causes of social harm. If they are representative of

329. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006) (authorizing the Federal Trade Commission to investigate
unfair trade practices or unfair or deceptive acts or practices affecting commerce, to hold
hearings and issue cease and desist orders, and to commence civil actions to recover civil
penalties and equitable relief against parties that fail to comply with the orders.)
330. 16 C.F.R. §§ 260.1– 260.8 (2012).
331. Diffenderfer & Baker, supra note 321, at 21.
332. Id. at 22.
333. See 16 C.F.R. § 260.5 (2012).
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community interests and are not dominated by any one funding
source, they may be able to garner sufficient public support to induce
public officials to regulate or generate interest in private governance
if the hazards and barriers to legislation appear to be too high. Trade
association and industry codes of conduct have been allowed to
crowd-out both public regulation and private governance institutions
that are more representative of the public interest. While
organizational structure may provide some insight about control and
the capacity of the organization to regulate in the public interest,
inquiry into the major funding sources for a proposed self-regulatory
regime would be more revealing. Before governments waive their
responsibility to regulate and before education and mobilization
initiatives and other private governance institutions cede the field to
institutions whose primary function is to lower the barriers to selfregulation within the targeted industry or to avoid formal regulation,
they and the media should focus on the institutions’ funding sources.
When standards are negotiated, private governance institutions
that supply structures that make the regulatory process transparent,
open, and inclusive are more effective in avoiding capture and
developing regulation in the public interest. By including structures
that foster broad public participation, transparency, and deliberative
processes that give stakeholders the ability to contribute in a
meaningful way, they allow constituents to overcome the regulatory
capture that increasingly clouds the process in a representative
democracy. As the number of parties involved at each stage of the
regulatory process expands, the expense of influence increases, and
capture becomes more difficult. Structures that provide for consensus
decision-making, or include tripartite structures that limit the power
of any one interest group to dominate, are more successful at
producing regulation in the public interest.
At the implementation stage, the primary obstacle to adoption of
the standards is the cost associated with change. Private governance
institutions can offer firms flexibility, lower the cost associated with
implementing the new rules, and level the playing field to reduce
market uncertainties that arise from change. Institutions that provide
price premiums and lower costs of capital investment or accelerate
cost recovery expedite adoption and implementation of standards.
Formal government may support implementation by protecting these
price premiums through regulation of false advertising claims for
credence goods or by providing tax benefits that permit more rapid
recovery of costs that firms incur during the implementation process.
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At the monitoring stage, a number of institutions address the
demands of monitoring by expanding the number of monitors. By
disclosing information and publicizing claims made by firms about
their activities, monitoring institutions enroll and empower activists,
shareholders, consumers, the media, competing firms, and the general
public to participate in the monitoring process. Unfortunately, most
institutions that relay firm-reported information about social and
environmental performance lack monitoring or verification systems.
In addition, except for employees, most of the additional “monitors”
lack opportunities to watch firm practices and expose any deviation
from what is set forth in the reports. Consequently, if the incentive to
cheat is not checked, these programs will not enhance efficiency.
Instead, they will direct consumption and investment flows to firms
that do not accurately meet consumer or investor preferences, which
reduces social welfare. Given that they rely primarily on the selfreported claims of industry, disclosure and reporting initiatives and
SRI programs could benefit from a whistle-blowing platform that
they either provide themselves or through collaboration with other
institutions involved in improving firm performance along social and
environmental parameters, such as learning initiatives. A whistleblowing platform would facilitate information sharing about
performance, noncompliance, and errors in the firm disclosure
reports. To the extent that private governance systems use auditing
systems to monitor compliance, they may avoid concerns about bias
by ensuring that auditors are financially and functionally independent
of both the advocacy organizations that developed the standards and
the targets being regulated.
Separate analysis of private governance institutions from
“hybrid” organizations that are instituted by formal government, such
as public voluntary programs and negotiated agreements, reveals two
key features that private governance institutions must provide to
ensure that the institution is stable and resilient over time. First,
dispute resolution structures support the enforcement stage. Because
there is no threat of criminal or other sanction except those that the
parties agree to and can impose on one another, private governance is
always limited to a coalition of the willing. The tensions that gave rise
to the development of a private governance institution in the first
place continue to exist between stakeholders after the standards have
been set and the program has been implemented. Disputes about fair
enforcement of the rules can destabilize hard-won alliances because
of the availability of exit.
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Conflicts, if left untended, may devolve into cheating, opting-out,
and institutional failure. Institutions that provide cheap, accessible
dispute resolution mechanisms support fair enforcement of the rules
and permit participants to resolve their conflicts quickly, thereby
preserving alliances. Dispute resolution systems enhance the
credibility of the institution and help to secure the long-term
involvement of its participants.
The second key feature is a funding structure. Tax revenues fund
much, if not all, of the governmental regulatory process, decoupling
the costs of regulation from the process of regulating. In contrast,
private governance institutions must not only satisfy the demands of
each of the five stages of regulation, but they must also fund each
stage of regulation. Free-riding may result in both instability and the
under-funding of public goods—the institutions necessary to monitor
compliance and enforce the rules. Allocation of the costs of
regulation is a sensitive matter in the context of private governance
because if participants perceive that the benefits and burdens of
regulation are distributed unfairly, the coalition may fail. In addition,
the source of funding may impact the forms the regulatory structures
take, rendering them less effective. Therefore, organizations that
generate sufficient value to cover their costs will be much more
resilient to the outside pressures and inside tensions that occur
throughout the regulatory process. Systems that include a market
element can potentially generate a premium that will cover some
portion of the governance process. Other institutional forms, such as
cooperatives, may reduce the need for monitoring and enforcement
by eliminating or reducing the incentives for agents to take advantage
of their partners. In addition, when institutional structures eliminate
the incentives to cheat, the need for and costs of monitoring are
reduced.
Finally, the institutional sorting process shows that only one type
of institution attempts to substitute for government at each stage of
the regulatory process: voluntary standards, certification, and labeling
systems. Voluntary standards, certification, and labeling systems
educate the public about the impacts of their consumption decisions,
activate consumer norms, and facilitate the internalization into the
price of a good the costs associated with avoiding social or
environmental harm. In addition, they address the transaction costs
that consumers face in locating and negotiating with the “cheapest
cost avoider” in global trade by creating structured links between
those parties; they resolve both the information asymmetries and
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search costs that consumers face in purchasing credence goods by
identifying conforming goods; they use structures that invite broad
participation and deliberation, reducing the risk of capture during the
standards-setting process; they provide training to develop an
expanding number of experts to assist firms in adopting and
implementing the standards; they use consumer markets and labels to
incentivize compliance; they generate their own financial support—an
important factor in maintaining legitimacy and effectiveness over
time; and finally, their certification processes ensure that participants
adhere to those standards. These systems are therefore marked for
more focused study, since they provide a unique solution to
governmental void and to situations in which government exists and
has authority to act but does not take action because of regulatory
fragmentation or race to the bottom dynamics.
Sorting the institutions by the roles they play in the regulatory
process also reveals the limits of a functional typology, since some
private governance institutions accomplish similar ends without
creating substitute regulatory regimes. For instance, cooperatives
address demands for governance not by mimicking the governmental
process, but by changing incentive structures. Cooperatives resolve
the principal–agent problem by placing the party to be protected on
both sides of the transaction, which reduces the need for monitoring.
They also allow competitors to collaborate to achieve economies of
scale and to compete with larger enterprises without losing the
competitive advantages they possess from time- and location-specific
knowledge. And finally, they accomplish these ends not by providing
structures that set a regulatory agenda and negotiate, implement,
monitor, and enforce those standards, but rather, by changing the
incentives that make standards, monitoring, and enforcement
necessary.

